In light of the exaggerated claims, counterclaims, and mischaracterizations surrounding   the recent news   of so-called “Wollega Fanno,” we have found it necessary to set the record straight. Based on our intelligence and on-the-ground assessments, here is what has been established:

1. Weak and Ragtag Composition that Targets Oromos

This group is a loose collection  of individuals with negligible military capability. Their organizational structure and operational power are practically non-existent. What they are known to do is     attack and loot the Oromo community in 11 kebeles in the area: Wofcoo Bangen, Haroo, Caffee Guddinaa, Margaa Jireenyaa, Siree Doorroo, Nacinoo, Ashuu Kusaayee, Qixuu Aabboo, Lalistuu Somboo, Baddeessaa and Guddinaa Jiireenyaa.   

2. Direct Links to Abiy Ahmed’s Intelligence and Military

This group operates entirely under the tacit permission and encouragement of the regime. Its so-called leaders were originally trained by the regime and held lower-level leadership positions within its militia forces until mid-September 2024. Around that time, disputes arose between them and local kebele officials, culminating in the attack of Margaa Lamuu, a kebele administrator, and killing of his colleagues Alamerew Reta and Aklilu Fekadu in Margaa Jireenyaa Kebele. While this incident caused some friction with the regime’s military, it did not escalate into a major rift. 

Currently, the group continues to receive direct support from Abiy Ahmed’s military. They maintain connections with specific intelligence operatives within the regime, although their exact purpose may not be fully understood by intelligence officers outside he operation in Horro-Guduru Wollega. Beyond internal sources, their    alignment with the regime is apparent from the following entirely publicly known facts:  

• Their recent press conference,   widely shared on social media, was conducted near Haroo in a school located in an area fully controlled by the regime’s military    forces.
• They station and train themselves just 5-10 kilometres from regime`s  forces         
• They freely move in and out of regime-controlled towns without obstruction, and on some occasions, they are openly escorted by the regime’s military  to sell their looted goods in markets such as Gutin and Nekemte
• The  regime not only tolerates and encourages them but actively disarms and intimidates local communities to prevent resistance against them,
• The regime’s military officers have been brazenly threatening local community, stating, “If you don’t send your sons to join the regime’s military, we’ll unleash this Fano group on you.” This coercion also exposes their role in enabling such groups and their reliance on fear tactics to force cooperation.

Without this state-sanctioned support, the political and social climate in Oromia would never tolerate—much less support—a group with an overtly anti-Oromo agenda, evident even in the name they chose for  the so called “Iz.”              

3. A Tool for Manipulation            

This group is deliberately maintained by the regime as a contingency tool to incite violence and fuel horizontal hostilities between Oromo and Amhara communities in Oromia whenever it serves the regime’s political interests. Their objectives are reminiscent of the actions of earlier Fano cells in Western Tigray, with one key difference:  their links to the regime are carefully concealed to create an illusion of independence.

4. Consistent with Abiy Ahmed’s Strategy

The use of clandestine armed groups aligns seamlessly with Abiy Ahmed’s broader strategy in Oromia, dating back to the derailed peace and transitional plan of 2018. It is worth recalling that this derailment was intentional, driven by two main objectives:

• To Use the OLA as a Pretext to Kill Plurality in Oromia: Abiy has long exploited the OLA as a scapegoat to attack all opposition forces in Oromia.
• To Manipulate the Amhara Political Community:  By framing the OLA as a phantom threat, Abiy sought to frighten and manipulate the Amhara political community into compliance.

This strategy has failed spectacularly. Under its current leadership, the OLA has grown into a formidable force loyal to the demands of the people and committed to justice and freedom. Abiy naively believed he could keep the OLA’s growth in check and continue using it as a scapegoat to justify his actions in Oromia and beyond. How wrong he was!    

5. Continued Monitoring             

We will continue to monitor and investigate the activities of this group  to uncover additional details. In the meantime, one thing is abundantly clear: no force with an anti Oromo agenda will be tolerated in the midst of our people.

OLF-OLA High Command

December 23, 2024