
REPORT 74

7 September 2026

Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopia

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Abbreviations

EEPA	Europe External Programme with Africa, Belgium
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Force
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
OFC	Oromo Federalist Congress
OLA	Oromo Liberation Army
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONM	Oromo National Media, incorporating Qeerroo Bilisummaa Oromoo and OLA
ORN	Oromia Refugee Network
OSG	Oromia Support Group
PP	Prosperity Party
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
TNH	The New Humanitarian
TPLF	Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
YHRL	Yale Humanitarian Research Lab

OSG total recorded killings of Oromo civilians since 2018

OSG has now documented the killing of 7,949 Oromo civilians in Ethiopia since 2018. This represents only a small fraction of the real total.

OSG Bank Details

We need your support

OSG needs funds to meet financial commitments mainly relating to refugees. Small regular donations by Standing Order would make a lot of difference. We are registered with the Charities Commission (Registered Charity Number 1164292) so please let us know if you are a UK taxpayer.

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Introduction

OSG Australia Submission to 63rd Session of UN Human Rights Council 7 September – 9 October 2026

This statement includes information contained in Reports 73 and 74 from the Oromia Support Group (OSG), which are available on its website at oromiasupport.org.

Human rights violations in Ethiopia are experienced by all of its peoples. The longest conflict has been waged by the current government since December 2018 in Oromia Region, targeting the youth, Qerroo, and other innocent civilians living in areas where the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) is most active.

Amhara Fano militants and government forces masquerading as Fano have continued their attacks on unarmed civilians in Horo Guduru and East Wallega zones in Oromia Region and in Oromia Special Zone in Amhara Region (Wollo). In 2026 they have also been increasingly active in Arsi, Oromia Region.

OSG has documented 7,862 civilian killings since September 2018. This is only a small fraction of the total. Since 1 April 2026 alone, at least 245 civilians have been killed; at least 38 of these by Fano.

Also, in early March, 32 villagers, including women and children, were slaughtered in a single attack by Fano in Abee Dongoroo district, Horo Guduru. At least 12 were killed by Fano in Agamsa, Horo Guduru, on 30 June/1 July and 11 or more were killed by Fano in Hanger Gutin, East Wallega, on 24 July, where they had gathered for a football tournament.

Killings by government forces have been particularly high in West Wallega (42 killed since April), Hararge (27 killed since April) and West Showa (20 killed since April).

Since March, artillery barrages and drone strikes by government forces have killed people and animals in East Wallega, North Showa and East Showa. Homes have been burned and villagers displaced in North, West and Southwest Showa, Wollo, Hararge, Bale, Arsi, Qellem, West Wallega and Buno Bedele zones.

Government forces masquerading as Fano and OLA are deployed against Amhara, Oromo and Gumuz communities with the sole purpose of fomenting hatred between them.

Abuses continue as outlined in previous submissions; displacement for corridor and vanity projects and clearing of land for foreign investors; rape and murder of young girls and women; lawlessness and extortion by government militias and forced conscription. There has been involuntary conscription of youngsters, often under 17 years of age, into national defence forces and, more recently, into the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) based in Asosa zone of Benishangul-Gumuz region. Older and infirm men are press-ganged into local militia. Refusal of conscription leads to detention, torture and killing.

By building an RSF base and developing facilities for drone attacks in Asosa airport, Ethiopia is being drawn into the Sudan civil war and thereby increasing the risk of the conflict becoming a regional conflagration involving several other forces and countries.

Criminal gangs, with connections to the government security apparatus, are actively engaged in robbery, extortion, violence and killing, especially in West Showa.

Behind the façade of progress and development in the capital, Finfinnee, and other major conurbations, lives a destitute and hungry population, heavily dependent on foreign aid, the distribution of which is once again rife with corruption and discrimination.

The government and Amhara supporters of Fano abuse their connections and influence in national and international media, non-governmental and governmental organisations and

institutions to demonise Oromo people and their organisations, especially the Oromo Liberation Army.

Even Amnesty International has been duped into biased and inflammatory propaganda against OLA, singling it out as almost the sole perpetrator of sexual violence against women in West Wallega, despite this being the opposite of the conclusions drawn by the UN Independent Commission of Human Rights Experts in Ethiopia. Massacres of civilians committed by government forces masquerading as OLA have been attributed to OLA itself in poorly-researched and biased reports by Amnesty International.

Oromo civilians, displaced by violence committed by government and Fano forces, constitute the bulk of Ethiopian refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries and to countries further afield including Egypt, Yemen and South Africa where they again experience hostility and lethal violence.

The global shift away from treating refugees with dignity and compassion has been particularly harshly experienced in these countries. Refugees are also met with hostility and discrimination in Djibouti and Somaliland.

Oromo and Sudanese refugees in Egypt have been detained in their hundreds and many, including registered asylum-seekers, have been returned against their will. At least one Oromo has died in detention in Cairo (in Dar El Salam police station on 22 July).

At least two Oromo registered asylum-seekers were killed by xenophobic mobs in Cape Town, South Africa, in early July.

Thousands of Oromo are trapped in Sana'a, Yemen, unable to escape the city because of forced conscription by Houthi militia and because of violence and extortion by traffickers. UNHCR offices are closed and unable to help. Migrants surviving lethal violence by border guards are liable to summary justice and execution for minor offences in Saudi Arabia.

Ever since the Oromo, the majority people of Ethiopia, were overrun by Amhara and Tigrayan tyrants in the 19th and early 20th centuries, they have been subjected to their zero-sum culture of absolute dominance and subjugation. Although slavery was eventually abolished by Italian invaders in 1936, serfdom within the *neftenya-gabbar* system continued until 1974.

Amhara racist and supremacist culture continues to exert itself in Ethiopia under the Prosperity Party government. Although nominal Oromo are part of that government, all the gains in autonomy and the adoption of the Oromo language within the 1995 federal constitution are in danger of being lost as the incumbent Prime Minister attempts to monopolise control within a presidential system, believing he has a mandate to do so since the flawed June election.

The fabric of society and governance is becoming increasingly unstable in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, because of the persistence of zero-sum, supremacist culture. The Oromo culture of compromise, power sharing, consensus decision-making and of checks and balances to avoid the monopoly of power by individuals and small groups, is evidenced in the ancient *Gadaa* system, recognised by UNESCO as of World Heritage significance.

By enabling the emancipation and self-determination of the Oromo, it would be possible to experience again the benefits of this culture. This could be the only way to restore peace, stability and respect for human rights in Ethiopia for all its peoples. Without self-determination for the Oromo and other oppressed peoples of Ethiopia, there will be no stability in Ethiopia. A peaceful and prosperous Ethiopia would allow stability and peace to develop in the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia's 'polycrisis' and the risk of regional conflagration

Experts at Tufts University and the University of Juba warn of a perfect storm of difficulties in the Horn of Africa. Prolonged conflicts in many of the countries, less than average rainfall in 2025 and 2026, exacerbated by the expected 'super El Niño', increased transport costs and lack of fertiliser availability due to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, reduction of western aid ('a devastating aid cliff') and the spreading Ebola epidemic are factors which are not only additive but multiplicative.¹

Alan Boswell, the Horn of Africa Project Director of the *International Crisis Group* wrote on 17 July of the background and history of the brewing crisis in Sudan, the involvement of Ethiopia and other regional forces and the risk of a larger regional conflict. His account includes much of the information about the involvement of the UAE (see pp.7-9) and he makes an urgent plea for dialogue and de-escalation.²

National Dialogue

The conclusion of the *Addis Standard* special edition on the National Dialogue reads thus:

The Ethiopian National Dialogue is one of the most ambitious experiments in inclusive deliberation attempted in contemporary Africa. Its legal architecture shows real procedural sophistication — the nested structure of the Thematic Working Groups, the cross-validation system, supermajority consensus thresholds, multi-modal inclusion mechanisms — and its eight thematic agendas confront directly the foundational questions of state structure, identity and governance that have sustained Ethiopia's protracted social conflicts.

Yet procedural ingenuity alone cannot resolve the severe legitimacy deficits built into the process. The continued exclusion of the primary armed groups — the TPLF, OLA and Fano — means the dialogue proceeds apart from the active conflicts reshaping the country's political landscape. Reliance on 4,000 non-elected delegates undermines its democratic mandate in a context of already-low public trust. That deficit is compounded by the Regional Representatives Group's structural imbalance, where Oromia's vote counts the same as Gambella's, Harari's or Dire Dawa's. Pursuing transformative political and constitutional reform through a process that lacks explicit constitutional grounding risks reproducing the very legal and structural instability it was established to resolve.³

Fano's objective in Wallega, Wollo and Showa

Zemene Kassie, chairman of the Amhara Fano National Movement, announced in August that Fano factions in Amhara Region had merged under a single command structure with Fano groups operating in Wallega, Wollo and Showa in Oromia Region.⁴ He stated that the coalition had reached an understanding with other groups opposing Abiy Ahmed's government and some have understood this to mean OLA. However, the admission that the Fano groups operating in Wallega, Showa and Wollo are part of the broader Fano movement is worrying.

¹ <https://theconversation.com/africas-greater-horn-region-is-facing-a-looming-polycrisis-fueled-by-conflict-prices-climate-and-disease-286071>

² <https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/africa/horn-africa/horn-africa-nears-boiling-point-time-urgent-diplomacy>

³ <https://addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/The-Quest-for-Consensus-%E2%80%94-Addis-Standard-Special-Edition.pdf>

⁴ <https://addisstandard.com/fano-leader-says-armed-groups-have-formed-coalition-to-work-toward-fall-of-abiy-ahmed/>

The atrocities committed by groups which self-identify as Fano against unarmed Oromo civilians in Wollo, North and West Showa, and particularly the recent mass killings in Horo Guduru and East Wallega zones (see p.29 *et seq.*) are crimes against humanity and cannot possibly be consistent with any sort of cooperation with OLA.

The Fano leader's claim that the insurgents are working to overthrow Abiy Ahmed is not necessarily good news for the Oromo people. Zemene Kassie said Fano was 'fighting for the survival of the Amhara people . . . fighting to protect Ethiopia and prevent its disintegration,' Although he said he was fighting 'for freedom and equality for all the nations and nationalities of Ethiopia,' the actions of Fano in Oromia demonstrate clearly that 'preventing the disintegration of Ethiopia' is code for re-establishing Amhara hegemony over the Oromo people, land and resources.

An insightful article published on 21 August by Asebe Regassa working from the University of Zurich documents the continued Amhara settler-colonialism in Horo Guduru and East Wallega since the resettlement campaigns of the Derg in the 1980s and its disastrous effects on Oromo society, education and welfare.⁵ Over half a million Oromo have been displaced in these zones since 2022. He wrote that at the core of the crises in western Oromia 'lie violence by Amhara expansionist militias collectively called Fano and the regime's counterinsurgency operations against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA).'

Dr Asebe wrote that the lowland areas of Horo Guduru and East Wallega were an 'agricultural frontier' for 'Amhara expansionist ambitions in Wallega.'

Fano forces were heavily armed by Abiy Ahmed to assist the ENDF in its war against Tigray. These forces are now pitted against unarmed peaceful Oromo. The downfall of Abiy Ahmed may not necessarily bring freedom for the Oromo people.

Involuntary conscription

Forced conscription into the ENDF and into local militia is widespread and increasing. In this OSG report alone, the unconstitutional practice is documented in Asosa zone, Benishangul-Gumuz Region and from nine zones of Oromia Region: Bosaat and Liban Cuqula districts and Adama city in East Showa; five districts in West Hararge and two in East Hararge; four districts in East Wallega; five districts in West Wallega, three districts and Dembi Dollo town in Qellem Wallega; four districts in West Showa, and in Tole district, Southwest Showa.

A substantive report, which included information from a report by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, appeared in *Addis Standard* on 13 August.⁶ This refers to cases from East Hararge, East Bale, East Showa, Jimma, West Arsi and Horo Guduru Wallega.

Youngsters have disappeared in detention in military camps after being taken from work, from homes during the night, or from public spaces. They included children as young as 11 years. Sometimes, parents of disappeared youngsters have been asked for large amounts of money, 30,000 birr in one reported case, to secure their release. They do not know if their children have been taken in a recruitment drive, kidnapped for ransom, or a combination of both.

The *Gachana Sirna* militia were established by proclamation in March 2022 to promote peace and security for local communities, but the result has been the opposite. Adults have been taken from their farms and forced to undergo militia training while they needed to tend

⁵ <https://curateoromia.com/fanos-territorial-claims-and-the-crisis-in-western-oromia/>

⁶ <https://addisstandard.com/forced-conscription-resurfaces-across-oromia-as-ethiopia-continues-to-grapple-with-security-crises/>

their farms. Refusal, at best, has resulted in denial of access to government seeds and fertiliser: at worst, non-cooperation results in detention, torture or even death. *Addis Standard* described how farmers were forced to undergo training for two months, during their planting season, in Shambu, Horo Guduru, after being detained by police when returning from market.

This OSG report documents how individuals or their relatives have been summarily executed or otherwise abused when refusing to be taken as conscripts (see pp.24, 25, 30, 42 and 43).

Official complaints to ENDF officials and the Oromia regional government have been met with silence or denials of malpractice.

UAE and RSF are getting away with murder; in fact, genocide

There is no doubt that Sudan's rebels, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) committed genocide in El Fasher, North Darfur, in October 2025, and no doubt that the United Arab Emirates were instrumental in facilitating that atrocity. The role of UAE in bankrolling Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, and the UAE involvement in establishing the RSF base near Asosa, Benishangul-Gumuz Region, was reported at length in OSG Reports 72 and 73.⁷

A recent revelation by Nathaniel Raymond, Executive Director of the Humanitarian Research Lab, Yale School of Public Health, was that the UK government could have prevented the genocide in El Fasher. His oral testimony to the UK International Development Committee on 23 June, was damning. A recording of that testimony is available,⁸ as is the written testimony.⁹ He stated that the UK failed to act because of the perceived risk to its relationship with the UAE. Lack of political will made possible the massacre by RSF forces of thousands of civilians in El Fasher.¹⁰

UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy failed to call out the atrocity despite having 'that intelligence.' There was no challenge to the UAE despite the country providing the 'pin in the grenade' for the 2024 capture of Zamzam camp, and despite the country facilitating the genocide in El Fasher the following year, by providing equipment, drones and mercenaries. A UN Security Council resolution (2736), which was proposed by the UK, temporarily halted the RSF advance on El Fasher but failure to follow this up with any diplomatic pressure at all permitted the genocide to unfold. The Yale Director said that all that was needed was a call to stop buying duty-free goods in Abu Dhabi airport or to refuse to go to the resort of Jumeirah Beach, for the UAE to have ordered the RSF to stop their advance.

It has taken a consortium of civil society organisations led by the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights to file a submission to the International Criminal Court concerning abuses by both sides in the Sudan conflict. The submission identifies the UAE as a key supporter of the RSF and names officials and intermediaries in Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda, although these names are not public.¹¹

⁷ Report 72, pp.9-10. <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-72-3-March-2026.pdf>; Report 73, pp.7-10. <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-73-12-June-2026.pdf>

⁸ <https://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/3e275eec-0db6-4869-b858-8c1738710df5>

⁹ <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/167667/default/s> already

¹⁰ According to The Guardian, up to 10,000 were killed and another 40,000 remained unaccounted for, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/mar/25/heroism-horror-and-the-pits-of-hell-inside-the-last-days-of-el-fasher>. According to a UN fact-finding mission, 'up to tens of thousands' died, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2026/07/10/un-genocide-sudan-iran-us-ceasefire-suspension-ai-cheat-sheet>

¹¹ Middle East Eye, 29 June 2026, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/senior-uae-and-regional-officials-referred-icc-alleged-role-darfur-atrocities>

The UAE, which has an abysmal human rights record, including detaining its leading human rights advocate, Ahmed Mansoor for the last nine years, continues to deny supporting and supplying RSF.¹² But the evidence is quite clear – albeit an inconvenient truth.

The conflict has already drawn in regional actors, with Tigray, Eritrea and Egypt siding with the SAF in opposition to Ethiopia and RSF.¹³ Libya, Yemen, Somaliland and Puntland are also embroiled and there is evidence of Israeli and US interest and influence in the civil war.

The UAE-controlled Global Security Services Group has recruited Colombian mercenaries and trained them alongside RSF fighters in four bases in Libya since April 2025.^{14,15,16} The Houthis insurgency in Yemen, supported by the UAE,¹⁷ is heating up with the bombing of Sana'a airport and Hodeidah port by Saudi Arabia.¹⁸ UAE has invested in the Somaliland port at Berbera and the Puntland port at Bosaso, both implicated in supplying RSF.¹⁹

Israel, the only country to recognise the sovereignty of Somaliland, plans to deploy Dolphin submarines equipped with Popeye Turbo Cruise missiles from a base in Berbera.²⁰ A draft UN report notes that three Boeing aircraft, linked to a US military contractor, transported mercenaries, weapons and drones for the RSF,²¹ and the US is expanding its base in Bosaso, without the approval of Mogadishu.²²

Meanwhile, SAF and RSF have traded drone attacks and control of the border town of Kurmuk,²³ and the RSF is poised to attack the besieged stronghold of El Obeid, whose population, already suffering from degraded infrastructure and shortage of fuel and water, fears imminent war crimes.²⁴

Toothless statements without direct reference to the UAE are a luxury Sudanese civilians cannot afford.

EU Observer, 18 June 2026

The build-up of a brigade-size RSF force in Asosa, preparing to enter Blue Nile province from Ethiopia, was reported in a Security Alert issued by Yale Humanitarian research Lab on 28 August. Materiel and up to 1,000 men were equipped and ready to invade.²⁵

Sudan's civil war enabled over \$1 billion in gold to go to UAE in 2025, and the nearly \$30 billion in undeclared artisanal gold which is exported from Africa to Abu Dubai each year

¹² <https://euobserver.com/222393/eu-shields-ties-with-uae-while-hallmarks-of-genocide-emerge-in-sudan/>

¹³ <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2026/03/23/regional-mega-war-renewed-conflict-ethiopia-sudan>

¹⁴ EU Observer, 18 June 2026, <https://euobserver.com/222393/eu-shields-ties-with-uae-while-hallmarks-of-genocide-emerge-in-sudan/>

¹⁵ Lighthouse Reports, 29 June 2026, <https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/inside-the-secret-network-fueling-sudans-war/>

¹⁶ Human Rights Watch, 25 May, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/05/25/sudan-colombians-linked-to-atrocities-trained-in-uae-bases>

¹⁷ <https://newlinesmag.com/running-notes/yemens-airspace-crisis-threatens-a-return-to-full-scale-civil-war/>

¹⁸ <https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/middle-east-north-africa/yemen-saudi-arabia/yemens-war-returning>

¹⁹ OSG Report 73, p.8, <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-73-12-June-2026.pdf>

²⁰ <https://militaryni.com/en/news/israel-plans-deploy-submarines-somaliland/>

²¹ <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/boeings-identified-reuters-report-carried-weapons-sudanese-paramilitary-un-2026-07-29/>

²² <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-military-base-somalia/>

²³ <https://www.eepa.be/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-743-9-July-2026.pdf>

²⁴ Yale Humanitarian Research Lab Situation Report 77, 29 June 2026, <https://ysph.yale.edu/download-file/76d1775e-de0c-4861-afae-7aa92c4c0228/>

²⁵ <https://ysph.yale.edu/download-file/c8d104c3-aea3-4706-8d42-9a4c42714b0e/>

pays for a lot of military hardware. The UAE is one of the best customers for Israeli defence contractors.²⁶

Despite the overwhelming evidence that the UAE is perpetuating the civil war in Sudan by propping up the genocidal RSF, no country or group of countries dares to challenge it or demand that it stops. The wealth of the UAE and its enormous economic leverage make it impregnable and immune from criticism. The silence, at most limp hand wringing, of countries which give lip service to human rights is shameful.

No country had the bottle to call out the UAE at the UN Human Rights Council, except the Sudanese SAF. NGOs which objected to this silence were subjected to intimidation by the UAE delegation.²⁷

The absence of political will to name and shame the UAE was also evident at the European Parliament on 9 July. Its resolutions included ‘MEPs [Members of the European Parliament] condemn in the strongest possible terms the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Sudan, in particular the atrocities taking place during the ongoing siege of the city of El-Obeid by the Rapid Support Forces.’ The MEPs proudly called for more humanitarian aid, and criticised the Global Security Services Group for breaking the arms embargo, but the role of the UAE, which hosts and controls that group was not mentioned.²⁸

The *EU Observer* called for an EU-wide arms embargo against the UAE, called for the EU to name and shame the UAE for its support of RSF, and urged Europe to leverage bilateral trade deals to end that support.²⁹ *Human Rights Watch* also stated that the EU resolution should have publicly shamed the UAE and precipitated firmer action.³⁰

As noted by the *EU Observer*, ‘The EU cannot genuinely pride itself on providing much-needed humanitarian aid to war-affected civilians in Sudan without acting and calling out the UAE’s role by name.’

Diplomatic silence about the UAE was finally broken with the publication of the report of the international independent fact-finding mission for the Sudan to the 63rd session of the UN Human Rights Council on 1 September.³¹ The UAE is named along with Ethiopia, Chad, Libya, Colombia and Puntland, as fuelling and supplying the war. Its role as the RSF’s major backer is now public knowledge.

The United Arab Emirates have bought their way into British life. The Arsenal Football Club stadium is named ‘*The Emirates*’ but has the UAE bought the world’s conscience too? The country certainly appears to have bought western politicians.

Press

ONM reported on 14 June that the press and residence permits of a French journalist for Catholic newspaper *La Croix* were revoked after she travelled to Tigray and submitted a

²⁶ <https://www.semafor.com/newsletter/08/04/2026/semafor-flagship-a-powerful-bargaining-chip>

²⁷ <https://genevasolutions.news/human-rights/at-human-rights-council-debate-on-sudan-a-persisting-reluctance-to-name-the-uae>

²⁸ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260706IPR46319/human-rights-violations-in-sudan-nigeria-and-pakistan>

²⁹ *EU Observer*, 18 June 2026, <https://euobserver.com/222393/eu-shields-ties-with-uae-while-hallmarks-of-genocide-emerge-in-sudan/>

³⁰ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/07/10/european-parliament-resolution-on-sudan-should-spark-action>

³¹ <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session63/advance-versions/a-hrc-63-23-auv.pdf>

report in the preceding two weeks. Large numbers of journalists have been killed, detained and forced into exile since Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018.

ONM described a ‘Media Army’ which spread ‘confusing and contradictory reporting’ in support of the Prosperity Party. Similar disinformation is peddled by Paul Kigame’s regime in Rwanda. His government was reported in *The Continent* to employ several tactics; challenging evidence, questioning credibility, emphasising official versions and counternarratives of critical reports and providing a deluge of favourable news stories to dilute them.³²

The *Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)* reported on 6 August the detention of the Editor-in-Chief of *Addis Standard*, Yonas Kedir, and the seizure of equipment and ransacking of the online magazine’s office.³³

Yonas was detained on 1 August, physically assaulted, interrogated and kept in detention overnight. Next day, armed security and intelligence forces raided the office and destroyed lighting and equipment in the specially built production studio. They seized all the audio and visual recording and production devices, including microphones and cameras, and computers which were essential to the running of the newsroom and multimedia unit.

On 3 August, under duress from the security service, the office landlord issued an eviction notice – illegal under their lease agreement – to leave the premises, where *Addis Standard* has been based for 16 years, within three days.

The Ethiopia Media Authority revoked the outlet’s online media registration certificate in February and held the Managing Editor, Million Beyene, in incommunicado detention for two weeks in April, after which he resigned his post.

The publication has been a leading independent voice in Ethiopia since it was established in 2011. Its editor, Medihane Ekubamichael, was detained briefly in 2020: its publishing licence was withdrawn for several days in 2021: and in 2025, there was a police raid on its office and an employee’s home and three managers were briefly detained.



The *Committee to Protect Journalists* also called on 13 August for the release of five journalists detained since 2023 for publishing articles about the Amhara Fano insurgency.³⁴ Using a tactic copied from the TPLF, their Prosperity Party captors offered release to Genet Asmamaw, Gobeze Sisay, Abay Zewdu, Dawit Begashaw, and Meskerem Abera (pictured left, clockwise from top left) but only on condition that they admit to terrorist charges and agree to never working again in journalism. They refused and remain in detention, after three years without trial.

Reuters announced on 28 August that three of its journalists who had been barred by the Ethiopia Media Authority for six months had been reinstated. The ban followed the *Reuters* investigation of the RSF base in Benishangul-Gumuz Region.³⁵

³² *The Continent*, Issue 247, 1 August 2026, pp.12-15. <https://www.scribd.com/document/1073235373/The-Continent-Issue-247>

³³ <https://cpj.org/2026/08/ethiopian-security-detain-addis-standard-editor-raid-newsroom-seize-equipment/>

³⁴ <https://cpj.org/2026/08/in-ethiopia-5-journalists-pressured-to-apologize-for-terrorism-to-win-release/>

³⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/ethiopia-reinstates-accreditation-reuters-journalists-after-six-month-suspension-2026-08-28/>

Ethiopia's debt: restructure probable but outcome uncertain

It was announced on 29 June that Ethiopia made a preliminary agreement with the G20 Common Framework to restructure its \$1 billion Eurobond.³⁶ The country defaulted on the bond in December 2023. Prolonged negotiations with international and private creditors resulted in a deal in January, but this collapsed due to lack of lender confidence. According to *Semafor Africa*, the new deal may restore investor confidence, reduce financing costs and open the door to liberalising Ethiopia's economy. However, a more sanguine assessment may be necessary.

An excellent and detailed analysis which described Ethiopia's financial woes and its dependence on other major economies was published by *Africa is a Country* within a day or two of the announcement.³⁷ Mebratu Kelecha traced how different regimes, from the imperial rule of Haile Selassie onwards, had failed to develop Ethiopia's economic independence, due to a combination of problems with the structure of international finance systems and problems inherent in the Ethiopian state.

He stated 'Successive debt regimes in Ethiopia have shown that external finance can protect sovereignty, finance coercion, or build development, sometimes all at once.'

The June agreement includes a 12% cut in principal, nearly \$100 million payment of missed coupons and access to a future international bond for investors.

Mebratu wrote that the new deal may be an important 'exit ramp' for the country's economy but only 45% of the bond holders were represented in the negotiations. Remaining issues included wider creditor acceptance and nonfinancial terms of the agreement.

He wrote that Ethiopia's foreign debt was not simply due to ambitious overspend during the boom years of double-digit growth under the EPRDF and was neither the result of a predatory international system nor of domestic incompetence on their own. It emerged from a history of different debt-regimes which he described thus:

Imperial governments borrowed selectively to preserve autonomy; the Derg used geopolitical credit to sustain a militarized state; the . . . EPRDF borrowed to accelerate structural transformation; and the present government has exchanged developmental discretion for emergency finance and restructuring. In every period, external money expanded state power. In every period, the state failed to build a sufficiently durable base of exports, foreign exchange, and accountable institutions to match its ambitions.

Mebratu detailed the mistakes of former regimes. Two recurring themes were the lack of democratic oversight and recurring costly wars. There are undoubted weaknesses in the international finance system but a more open economy and system of governance, more equal opportunity for all of the country's citizens (in education, the administration and distribution of wealth), a less coercive agricultural policy and, simply, peace would have gone a long way to help.

Successive debt regimes in Ethiopia have shown that external finance can protect sovereignty, finance coercion, or build development, sometimes all at once.

Although the EPRDF reduced poverty and stimulated growth, it did not raise productivity, tax earnings and foreign exchange enough. Reserves were not sufficient. Domestically, land expropriation, youth unemployment, uneven development in Ethiopia's regions and

³⁶ <https://www.semafor.com/article/06/29/2026/ethiopia-agrees-1b-bond-restructuring-deal>

³⁷ <https://africasacountry.com/2026/07/ethiopias-debt-problem>

authoritarian allocation of investment produced the protests from 2015 that destabilised the EPRDF government.

The early promise of growth and liberalisation under Abiy Ahmed was thwarted by the continuation of these difficulties plus the Covid pandemic, the devastation of the 2020-2022 Tigray war and the conflicts in Oromia and Amhara regions. At a time of increasing security and humanitarian needs, decreased donor support led to reduced productivity, deteriorating public services and lack of investor confidence.

Inflation running for years at around 30% reduced real earnings and increased the cost of imports. Conflicts have destroyed facilities, displaced communities and, importantly, closed schools. Millions of children are deprived of education.

No debt operation can compensate for the fiscal and human costs of recurrent war.

Mebratu opines that complete financial independence is an impossible goal for Ethiopia but makes three suggestions for its future economic health. The first is transparency; parliamentary oversight and disclosure of the metrics of its economy.

The second is a more realistic industrial policy with more focus on raising productivity, exports and revenue. Instead of high visibility prestige projects, priority should be given to agricultural processing, tourism, logistics, digital services and a reliable power supply.

Third is the protection of basic necessities – health, primary education, nutrition and targeted cash transfers for the least affluent. Only stability, peace and negotiated settlements of disputes will allow this to happen.

Mebratu stated, ‘no debt operation can compensate for the fiscal and human costs of recurrent war.’

‘The durable measure of autonomy is not whether Ethiopia borrows. It is whether citizens can see, contest, and benefit from the choices made in their name.’

Meanwhile, ONM reported on 20 June that a government federal audit revealed the embezzlement of 21 billion birr by government institutions, of which only 6 billion had been returned to the treasury.

EU resumes direct budget support despite Ethiopia’s human rights abuses

In a disappointing reversal of its principled (but shallow) stance on human rights, the European Union has reinstated direct budget support for Ethiopia.

In an article written in *Addis Standard*, Dr Gemechu Abeshu described the trajectory of EU budget support in recent years.³⁸ Reasons for the resumption of Europe’s blank cheque, which Ethiopia can use to arm itself against its people, are spurious.

The EU withdrew its 90 million Euro direct budget support in December 2020 because of the Tigray war which began one month previously. Return of the support was conditional on humanitarian access and cessation of hostilities. There were additional concerns about atrocities and human rights abuses elsewhere and the restriction of press freedom and civic space.

³⁸ <https://addisstandard.com/policy-without-evidence-eu-budget-support-resumption-schengen-visa-restoration-ignore-ethiopias-human-rights-crisis/>

In April 2024, the EU imposed a blanket ban on visas for Ethiopian nationals because of the country's lack of cooperation in accepting back irregular migrants and refused asylum-seekers.

In April 2026, direct budget support – which Ethiopia can use for whatever it chooses – was resumed and the visa ban was lifted. The quoted reason was ‘substantial and sustained improvement’ in migrant return procedures and the aspiration that reforms on human rights would follow this re-engagement.

The shameful reversal occurred against a backdrop of the continued man-made humanitarian disaster in Tigray and the large-scale killings, sexual violence, detention and displacement of hundreds of thousands associated with conflicts since 2018 in Oromia and 2023 in Amhara Region. These abuses have been widely documented by OSG, major international human rights organisations and the UN Human Rights Council.

Impunity for reckless warmongering and human rights abuse has been rewarded by the EU in a way that will only encourage more conflict and abuse; by financing more of the same.

In summary, the EU is rewarding Ethiopia's Prosperity Party for cooperating in taking back its refugees from Europe, regardless of conflict and the continued abuse of their human rights: which were the main reasons for their exodus in the first place.

OLA defectors in detention

ISS, OSG's correspondent in Cairo, sent a list of the names of OLA members who followed their commander Sanyi Nagasa in defecting to the Prosperity Party government, expecting roles in the administration.

Sanyi has previously been reported to be responsible for the boot-camp training of government employees but 148 of the OLA faction which followed him were named and reported by ISS on 20 June to have been placed in detention.

Human Rights Report

Finfinnee, Shaggar City and Finfinnee Special Zone

Killings

ONM reported on 13 June that armed gangsters of the ‘120 group’ which have worked in cooperation with the *Koree Nageenya* apparatus to intimidate, imprison and kill Oromo in West Showa, had extended their operations to Burayu, west of Finfinnee in the Special Zone around the capital. They were reported to be active in Kattaa, Gujee, Gafarsaa and other districts of Burayu sub-city and to be responsible for the detention, among many others, of the manager of the Awash Bank in Katta for three days.

According to ONM, the Mayor of Shaggar city, Dr Tashoomee Addunyaa, and Federal Deputy Police Commissioner, Darajee Mul'ataa, have links to the ‘120 group’ and allow its members to operate with impunity.

The 120 gangsters went to the Gafarsaa bus station late morning on 9 June and demanded money from **a tow-truck driver named Darajjee**. When he refused, he was accused of being an OLA supporter, stabbed to death with a knife and robbed of 6,000 birr. His body was then thrown in the Gafaarsaa river.

Truck driver and father of three, **Ibsa Tulluu**, popularly known as Abbittii, (shown right with his truck) was driving from Harar and on the road from Adama to Finfinnee when, at the exit of a check point in Galan town, within Shaggar city, a police motorcyclist drove recklessly in front of him.



The unavoidable collision resulted in the death of the police motorcyclist. Another police officer at the checkpoint immediately strode to the truckdriver's cabin and shot Ibsa in the head, killing him instantly – a summary execution. Both W1 and ONM reported the incident to OSG. According to ONM, Ibsa was originally from Dembi Dollo and was the father of one child, not three.



Geremu Bobo (pictured left) was killed at Gefersa Burayu in Shaggar city during the evening of 14 August. He was a civilian who was born in Bilo Boshe district, East Wallega (W1).

Extortion, beating and detention

Government forces in the Special Zone around Finfinnee were reported in June by ONM to be singling out Oromo youth, especially those from Wallega zones, for mistreatment, extortion and detention.

On 1 June, a government party official named Girmaa Tulluu, was reported to be harassing and detaining youngsters from Wallega in Holota town, 45 km west of the capital. On 26 June, a similar process of targeting youth from Wallega for harassment and detention was reported in Sandarfa Bakkee town, 38 km northeast of the centre.

In early June, Prosperity Party 'operatives' in Duukam town ordered a businessman named Mammush to pay 100,000 birr for a second time. When he refused, he was imprisoned and his vehicle and cargo were confiscated (ONM).

On 23 June, ONM reported that government militia in Ashawa Meedaa in the Dirree Cirrachaa district of Burayu sub-city, were targeting youth on public roads, beating them and taking their smartphones before detaining them on fabricated charges of having OLA-related images on their devices. Their families have had to pay 20,000 to 30,000 birr to secure their release. Those with families which are unable to raise this money remain in detention, where they continue to be mistreated. Dozens have reportedly been held for more than 8-9 months in Aannee Diimaa, Dirree Sololiyaa and the 3rd District prison.

North Showa

Killings

On 7 June, a member of government militia in Kuyyuu district, **Tafarii Simee**, was shot dead by colleagues 'in a dispute' (ONM).

Farmer and father of four, **Aabbuu Suudee Boruu**, a resident of Qundee village in Warree Gabroo kebele, Darra district, was shot and killed by government security forces on 8 June after being held for a week in a local military camp, where he was reportedly beaten and tortured. He was not involved in any political activity, according to ONM.

ONM reported that on 16 June in Kuyyuu district, **two young men** were taken from prison and executed. On the same day, **two villagers** in Dubana Agalu, Kuyyuu district were killed and three others were wounded when government forces fired heavy weapons into the community. Two homes were burned down.

A **militia member** was killed and six others wounded in Ejere town, Hidhabu Abote district, in a dispute over the distribution of loot taken from the population, in which hand grenades were discharged (reported by ONM on 23 June).

W1 reported the killing of **four Oromo youths** in Dera city on 3 August. They were taken from the police station and executed. Their bodies were left where they were killed (see right). W1 was unable to provide their names.



Former detainee and OFC politician Jawar Mohammed posted on Facebook a recorded interview with **Dereje Olana**, which was forwarded by W1 and viewed on 6 August.³⁹ Dereje was from Ada Warabo in Eko Efo Babo village, Sululta district. In the two-minute recorded interview, he describes witnessing the killing of his brother, **Feyisa Olana**, in 2024. After the interview, he was himself killed in front of his children. As Jawar Mohammed pointed out, Sululta is a mere 30 km from the splendour of the capital.

Disappearance

W1 reported on 1 August that Nagaash Tolaa (pictured right) was detained in Chancho, a town in Sululta district, on 18 April 2024 and disappeared in detention.



His family have been unable to trace him since then and fear that he has been killed.

Burning, looting, detention

In the first week of June, the homes of three women in Hidhabu Abote district were burned down by government forces who claimed the women had family members in OLA (ONM).

ONM reported that in late June homes in Hamdaa Weezaroo kebele, Sululta district (which is also described as being in the Oromia Special Zone around Finfinnee and Shaggar city), were destroyed by government soldiers because their owners were suspected of providing food to OLA members. Many thatched and zinc-roofed homes and their contents were burned to the ground including those belonging to Tashoomaa Hordofaa, Ayyaanee Baay'isa, and Girmaa Hordofaa.

The destruction of properties by government forces in Dubana Agalu village, Kuyyuu district was reported by W1 and by ONM on 23 and 25 June respectively. Two villagers had been killed and two homes destroyed one week previously (see above). W1 sent a photograph of the destroyed village (below).

He named ten villagers whose homes had been burned down, with their contents, and listed some of the animals and goods which were looted:

³⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1357819912590144>

Girma Lenjiso, seven cows robbed
 Dabale Damise, six cows robbed
 Tolasa Dabale
 Ijara Adugna, two properties burnt and 14 cows robbed
 Bedassa Nure, cows and sheep robbed
 Dhugasa Waktole, maize, sheep and cows robbed
 Ms Aberu Gemechu, cows robbed
 Yazo Teferi, house contents robbed
 Dechasa Tilinti
 Tolashi Tadesa
 W1 reported that Tolashi Tadesa was also detained.
 ONM named all but one of these and wrote that grain stores had also been destroyed.
 According to ONM, Tadesa Bari and his wife Tolashi Tadesa were detained because their children were OLA members.



West Showa

Killings

The Annual Report for 2025 by OLLAA reported that **eight civilians** in Hallo Dikii kebele, Nonno district, were killed by Fano militants on 19 October 2025.⁴⁰ This incident was not previously reported by OSG.

On 30 May, an **18-year old woman** was killed while working on a farm in Meta Walqite district by heavy artillery fire from government forces (ONM).

Caalaa Dandanaa Tolaa, a young man, was shot dead ‘in front of this parents’ for refusing to work on a polling station in Jaldū district on 31 May (ONM).

A farmer in Dire Incinni district, **Kumsa Oli**, was shot dead by a militia member for refusing to join the local government militia on 3 June.

ONM reported that 20-year old **Dajanee Iddeessaa** was clubbed to death by a police officer (named Booreessaa by ONM) in Eelaa Amuuma, Meta Walqite district, on 5 June. The police officer reportedly had personal reasons for attacking the young man. Dajane died on the way to Incinni hospital.

⁴⁰ <https://ollaa.org/violence-and-impunity-civilian-suffering-inoromia-ethiopia-2025/>

On 13 June, **Dajane Jifaar**, a farmer in Ada'a Barga district, was shot dead by government forces, accused of supporting OLA (ONM).

Two civilians in Jaldū district, **Mrs Ayaluu Caalaa** and **Bojaa Garbee**, were killed by a 'heavy weapon' fired by government forces on 13 June. Three days later in the same district, **an elderly man** and **a woman** were killed in a heavy weapon strike and many others wounded. Mrs Araarsee Katamaa Caalaa was seriously wounded by mortar fire, also on 16 June in Jaldū district (ONM).

A gifted 8th grade student at Qotaa Illoo Primary School in Dire Incinni district, **Wabi Girmaye**, was killed inside the school compound by armed thugs acting on the instruction of local party officials because his older brother is a member of OLA (reported on 24 June by ONM).

Three Oromo youths were taken from their homes in Wagidii Badesa kebele, Meta Walqite district, and executed in the forest near Wagidii military camp. Military commanders prevented their families from retrieving their bodies, which were exposed to wild animals (reported by ONM on 24 June).

On 25 June, ONM reported that a respected elder was targeted for killing because of his standing in the local community in Meta Robi district. **Girmaa Baqqalaa Eda'ee** was taken from his home in Gooroo village, Warqee Waleensuu kebele, and executed by soldiers.

The armed gang known as '120 Mafia' which operates with the cooperation of local security officers in West Showa,⁴¹ killed **Tsaggaa Baqalee**, an 11th grade student on the street in Ambo as he returned from worship (ONM, 25 June).

Gadisa Buta Tolosa (pictured right), a young woman from Robi 01 kebele, Meta Robi district, was killed by government forces on 9 July (W1).



Dejene Tolasa (shown left), a resident of Cobi district, was arrested and killed by government forces on 15 July. As seen in the image, he was proud of his Oromo heritage, but W1 reported that he had no political affiliation and had no connections to OLA.

Nagaa Muluna and **Giddoo Dirribaa** (pictured right), two youths from Amaya district in Southwest Showa, were taken from their homes to Jibaat district in West Showa, where they were executed

on 21 July and their bodies discarded as shown, far away from their families (W1).



W2 reported on 4 August the killing of **Ajjama Dhuguma**, a teacher in Meta Robi district. He is shown at the top of the next page. His body was discarded in a ditch.

⁴¹ OSG Report 73, pp.6-7, <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-73-12-June-2026.pdf>



Maskalo Merdasa, a student in Bako Tibe district, was killed and his friend Addisu Mari arrested by government security forces on 17 August (W1).

On 28 August, **Qajeela Balay** (pictured right), a resident of Bako city, Elfata district, was killed by government forces, according to a report from W1 next day.



Sexual violence

Ten mothers in Ada'a Berga district (named by ONM) were detained and repeatedly raped by local militia members Amaanuu Hundeessaa, Seefuu Asaffaa, and Abarraa Gonfaa, and administrator Olaanaa Mokonnnon, in Gatira Nabee kebele. They were kept in detention for several days beginning on 29 May, and released only after each of them paid 10,000 birr.

Detention and disappearance

Over a seven-week period between 20 May and 14 July, OSG received 11 reports from ONM and W1 of detention, often in unknown locations, from six of the 24 districts of West Showa – Ada'a Barga, Dire Incinni, Liban Jawi, Chalia, Jaldū and Meta Robi.

Most of those detained were farmers in areas where OLA had been active but detainees also included young men and a prominent trader. Some were the sole providers for large families, like farmers Galana Qixata (father of nine) and Shalama Gamachu (father of four) from Buyama Dabale in Dire Incinni district who were taken into unknown, incommunicado detention in mid to late June.

Three farmers in Ada'a Barga district were accused of harbouring OLA fighters when arrested and their houses searched on 6 June. Four others in the district were arrested on 11 June, accused like most of the detainees of supporting OLA.

Wealthy trader Caalaa Gammadaa was taken from 01 kebele, Jaldū district on 26 June and tortured to make him hand over his cash and goods. Others were abducted during raids to take forced conscripts.

Injured

Government soldiers wounded Ararse Katama (right), while on her farm in Olgo village, Jaldū district, on 15 June (W1).

Caalaa Nagasa, a young man living in Innee Gabiye kebele, Jaldū district, was shot while lying in bed when soldiers broke into his home in June. His right arm was badly damaged and he had severe internal



injuries. He was reported on 27 June to be in Ambo hospital under armed guard, where his survival was reported to be ‘highly uncertain’ (ONM).

Burning

ONM reported on 13 June that the home of farmer and father of seven, Lamma Badhadha, in Buyama Rogee village, Dire Incinni district, was burned down and the area ‘turned into a military camp’ while his family were living out in the open. His son was alleged to be a member of OLA.

Extortion, looting and coercion

ONM reported each of the following incidents:

When two farmers in Hulluqo Birbirs village, Meta Robi district, were falsely accused of harbouring deserters from local militia on 11 May, security forces took 12 cattle, worth 600,000 birr, from them, which was ‘their families’ entire livelihood.’

On 20 May, at the time of the arrest of farmer Ifaa Badhadha in Warra Iluu, Ada’a Barga district, accused of having links to OLA, party members stole three quintals of teff from him and 100,000 birr and other household items from his neighbour, Dabalee Dinquu,

Eight days later, four farmers from the same kebele were taken from working on their own land and forced to work on land belonging to party affiliates. Over 60 farmers were taken from Bishaan Diimoo kebele and forced by militia to ‘harvest private timber’ – another throwback to the *neftenya-gabbar* system.

Three elderly farmers were forced to carry weapons for government militia in Jibaat district on 1 June.

ONM reported on 13 June that government soldiers were sent to all rural villages in Chalia district to collect 50kg of grain from each household for ‘militia support.’ Those who were unable to comply were accused of supporting OLA, beaten and/or detained.

On 14 June, Prosperity Party militia reportedly took mobile phones from residents in Dire Incinni district. On 23 June, ONM reported that farmer Araarsaa Dabbaal in Kooluu Galaan kebele, Jaldu district, was robbed of two oxen as well as being badly beaten by soldiers. On 25 June, local militia in Abuna Gindeberet district were reported extorting money from people returning from market.

Forced conscription

In June, youngsters were taken by force for military training in Chalia and Toke Kutaye districts, and people taken for militia training from Abuna Gindeberet district. On 2 July youngsters were forcibly conscripted, taken during the night, from Gatira Nabee kebele, Ada’a Barga district.

Southwest Showa

Killings

In Report 72 (p.18), OSG reported being informed by W1 that killings had occurred in November 2025 in Dache town, Sodo Dache district, but the informant was unable to provide details. In its annual report for 2025, OLLAA reported that **six unarmed followers** of the traditional Oromo religion, *Waaqeffannaa*, were killed by government forces while practicing their faith in Dache on 8 October.

W1 reported that **Hirphasaa Guddisaa**, a teacher at Leman Secondary School in Qarsa Mallima district, was killed on 12 June. He is pictured right. His arrest from home at 11.00 p.m. on 7 June and subsequent disappearance in detention was reported by ONM. He was accused of supporting OLA.



ONM reported that in the first two weeks of June, **Abbuu Tayee**, a farmer in Amaya District, was killed in his home by government security forces.



Prominent resident of Tume Wayu kebele, Tole district, **Haata'uu Waacilaa**, was killed by government militia at a location named Lidataa, around mid-June, during a raid on the village in which goods were stolen and youths taken for involuntary conscription into the army (see below).

On 24 July, **Bekele Kasaye**, a 21-year old from Batu, Tole district, was killed by government forces (W1).

The owner of a small shop in Dawo district, a young man named **Abera Banti** (pictured left), was arrested and killed by government forces on 28 July, and the contents of his shop stolen (W1).

Three young men, Gidoo Dirriba, Nagaa Mulunaa and another whose name was not known to ONM, were taken from their homes in Amaya district after being accused of being OLA supporters, an allegation denied by their neighbours. They were taken to a remote area of Jibat district in West Showa, tied up and executed. Their bodies were left at the site. The incident was reported by ONM on 31 July.

Lataa Garamu (shown right), a young man living in Bune village, Bacho district, was killed by government soldiers on 16 August (W1).



Detention, shooting, beating and forced conscription

An elderly couple were arrested and a farmer, Bayisa Dandana, was shot and wounded by government forces in Dawo district on 26 May for allegedly supporting OLA. Caala Caka, a villager in Qarsa Mallima district, was beaten on 15 June for harbouring a deserting soldier (ONM).

ONM reported the arrest of civilians accused of supporting OLA on 19 June in the districts of Tole and Bacho two days later.

When government forces raided the Tume Wayu community in Tole district in the middle of June, killing Haata'uu Waacilaa (see above), looting and pillaging (see below), they took youngsters away to a military camp, presumably as involuntary conscripts, although their execution cannot be ruled out. Among them were Garramaa Barjuu, Tonkoluu Obsee, Immaabeet Adaanaa, Milkaa Waacilaa, Abdii Abbabaa, Tarroo Uumamaa, and Gammachuu Dammasaa (ONM).

On 13 June, an 80-year old man was taken for militia training in Tole district (ONM).

Extortion, looting and coercion

Government militia collected 1,000 birr from merchants and 500 birr from farmers in Bacho district at the end of May, under threat of detention (ONM).

On 15 June, a cow, money and other property was stolen from a woman, Zanabu Geetu Girma, in Tole district (ONM).

During the lethal raid on Tume Wayu, Tole district, in mid-June, government security forces took an ox, two donkeys and ten sheep from Zaru Ababa; the entire house contents, four quintals of teff and six quintals of other grains from Tamasgu Tsegaye; and a horse, two oxen, horse livery and domestic appliances from Mengistu Dachasa.

On 31 July, ONM reported that farmers, including those in Goro Gabri'eli village, Qarsa Mallima district, were taken from their own fields and forced at gunpoint to till fields belonging to government cadres and militia, just as in the days of the *neftenya-gabbar* system.

Arbitrary taxes imposed on market vendors in Wanci district were reported by ONM on 11 August.

Burning and displacement

Militia led by Prosperity Party head of Sadeen Sodo district, Baacaa Tashoma, attacked villagers of Algaa Wasarbi on 10 June, accusing them of collaborating with OLA. They burned many homes and their contents in the hamlet of Qacama, including three belonging to Canaqa Ganana Tadasa, two belonging to Tura Cibsaa Bonsa and one belonging to Angesa Jidha.



Properties were put to the torch by government forces in Qarsa Mallima district on 19 August, according to a report from W1, who sent the images shown above right.

Oromo/Gurage conflict

Residents of Sadeen Sodo district reported to ONM that clashes between Oromo and Gurage communities from the Bu'i district of Gurage zone of Central Ethiopia Region, occurred on 10 June. The conflict involved the villages of Bonu Egado and Amawotee Laligee. Their communities had coexisted peacefully for many years and residents told ONM that the confrontation was orchestrated by an Amhara security official in Cululle town, Sadeen Sodo district, named Warqina.

East Showa

Killings

OLLAA, in its annual report for 2025,⁴² attributed three civilian killings to OLA. These were not confirmed by OSG informants:

Babo Dadhi, aged 40, and **Sisay Habatamu**, aged 33, from Mallima Bari kebele, Bora district were killed on 27 November 2025, allegedly for spying for the government.

Nega Haile, from Bekele GIRRISA kebele, Dugda district, was killed on 14 December, after his family was unable to pay a ransom for his release.

Whether this atrocity was committed by 'Government OLA' or by outlawed rogue OLA fighters is not known. Genuine OLA does not condone violence against innocent civilians.

The killing of Waqjira Waqshum in Adama city on 20 May was briefly reported in OSG Report 73 (p.28). ONM later wrote that he was executed 'in broad daylight,' shot in the head at close range by a militia member named Addisuu Bakkuu, because he had refused to give

⁴² <https://ollaa.org/violence-and-impunity-civilian-suffering-inoromia-ethiopia-2025/>

money to the militia. He had previously been detained for the same reason. ONM also wrote on 22 May that a mother in Bora district had been tortured and killed for resisting militia training but no details were given.

Makkoo Umar Roobaa, a woman in Bosat district, was reportedly shot dead by a militia member after witnessing him ‘fleeing from a fight’ on 4 June (ONM).

Daawwit Mul’ataa Dinqaa, a young man in Adama city, was shot dead by a policeman on 4 June, falsely accused of being an OLA supporter and an escapee from prison (ONM).

A drunken altercation between militia members and soldiers belonging to an anti-guerilla unit, allegedly fighting over a female civilian, led to a gunfight in a bar in Bofaa town, Bosat district, in mid-June. Two militiamen, **Tulluu Gammachuu** and **Gabii Masqalee**, and a man in the anti-guerilla unit were killed: another militia member was badly wounded (ONM, 24 June).

W1 reported on 28 August the killing by Fano of two truck drivers on that day or the previous day in Walanciti district. One was named **Abusha Olkeba** (near right). The name of the **other driver** (far right) was not known. Several drivers of trucks and other vehicles have been killed this year by government and Fano forces along the main road to the east, running through Walanciti (see OSG Report 73).

Drone attacks and intimidation from the air

ONM reported that heavy weapons were used against civilian areas of Adama town, in the Doonii area of Bosat district and in Fantale district in June.

On 12 June, drone strikes destroyed homes and properties in the Horofee area of Waldaa Qal’inaa village, Dugda district.

Aircraft joined drones in terrorising residents of Bosat and Fantale districts throughout the whole of one morning during the following week (reported by ONM on 24 June), trapping residents in their homes and preventing economic activity.

Disappearance

Chuuchaa Gaarii, a young man living in Adama town, was accused of supporting OLA and taken to an unknown location on 19 June. His place of detention or the location of his body remained unknown at least until the ONM report on 30 June.

Detention

On 18 May, at least 14 civilians were beaten for refusing conscription into local militia in Hombole, Bora district. Eight were taken next day to detention centres in Bote, in the same district, four of whom were named by ONM.

Numerous arrests were reported in Bishoftu city in the first two weeks of June, following the election, affecting civilians in areas of the city including Jituu, Dhaka Bora (Qaajimaa), around the airbase in kebele 06, and industrial areas.

Many, including at least one teacher, were held in a police prison in Shan Calaa kebele. Guards and military personnel were among those accused of having ties to OLA who were detained in Dhankaakaa, near Gaafaat arms factory (ONM).



Nine young men were taken to a military camp in Bosat district on 16 June and beating and arrests were reported in Bora district on 17 June and Fantale district on 21 June (ONM).

In the last two weeks of June, more arrests were reported by ONM in Adama town and the Adami Tulluu Jiddoo Kombocha district.

Former politician and detainee Jawar Mohammed reported via a Facebook post on 28 or 29 June that youngsters wearing t-shirts with the image of singer Haachalu Hundessa were being detained in police stations in Adama city. The city art institute was prevented from mounting an event which celebrated his life. Haachalu, the icon of the peaceful Qeerroo movement which forced the EPRDF from power in 2018, was assassinated on 29 June 2020.

Extortion

ONM reported that in June over 50 government militia members were extorting money and property from residents in Fantale, Dugda and Bora districts, under various pretexts.

On 21 June, a subsistence farmer and head of a large family, Sayidoo Dhaddachoo, in Godoo Faafaatee kebele, Fantale district, was detained for refusing to hand over his son for conscription into the army. His family were ordered to pay 200,000 birr on threat of his being executed (ONM).

In the administrative district of Adama city, militia were reported by ONM on 11 August to be demanding 30,000 to 50,000 birr from families to exempt their children from conscription.

Armed attacks, cattle theft and denial of land use

Government forces, supported by Afar militia, fired on Oromo civilians in Qobbo, Fantale district, on 2 June and attacked Oromo herders on 5 June in Banti kebele in the same district. In the second assault, government troops stole over 1,000 head of cattle. They slaughtered 28 for food and took the others to Awash military camp. They demanded 2,000 birr per head for them to be released back to their owners, claiming the pastoralists had been supporting OLA (ONM).

On 24 June, ONM reported that farmers in Baartaa Saamii kebele, Bora district, were being prevented from cultivating their land, in retaliation for perceived support for OLA, which had been active in the area.

Conscription

Forced conscription was reported on 29 June to have taken place in Bosat district. Federal soldiers and party cadres surrounded secondary schools in Bofaa and Boolee towns and forcibly removed students who had just completed their final classes for the year and prevented them from returning to their homes.

They were taken together with their bags and books to distant training camps. Included in the transports were frail and elderly men who had been ‘pulled directly from their doorsteps’ for militia training (ONM).

In Liiban Cuqqaalaa district, local militia led by commander Namsoo Obsee rounded up dozens of young people, including 17-year old Mishaa Jaadoo Badhaasoo and 18-year old Abuluu Badhoo Wandooshaa, from markets and schools in Adulaalaa town on 2 August (ONM).

Forced conscription in Adama city administration area was used as an opportunity for extortion (reported by ONM on 11 August, see above).

Wollo and Amhara Region

Killings

Fano militants attacked Karaa Dimtuu in Utaaltee kebele, Artuma Furse district in the Oromia Special Zone of Amhara Region (Wollo) on 7 June. Two of the villagers killed were named by ONM. **Aduro Aliyi Hussen** and **Mrs Zahara Musa Abdalla** died when ‘sprayed with bullets.’ Eleven cattle belonging to Zahara were looted. The Fano militants shot and killed another eight cows (ONM).

On 15 June, **Hasan Yusuf** was killed and several others were wounded in Chafa Robit district when Fano militia, supported by Prosperity Party forces, attacked Oromo residents.

ONM reported on 25 June that Fano forces, again supported by federal soldiers, launched an attack with heavy weapons on villages in the Jarro area of Artuma Furse district, killing **Ahmed Usiyo, Hasan Huseen Umare, Ibrahim** and **Aliyi Hasan**. Dozens of others were wounded, among them Mrs Khadija and other mothers.

Africa Press reported on 9 August that **five innocent civilians** were killed in an attack on a minibus in Ligmabo, South Wollo zone, Amhara Region.⁴³ Three died instantly and two more died from injuries. The attack was blamed on Fano forces which had prepared an ambush for federal soldiers expected to be traveling on the road.

Detention/disappearance

ONM reported the detention of mother of five Amoo Huseen, a shopkeeper in Baate town in Baate district, on 2 June. Her four-month old infant was detained with her but their location was still unknown on 29 June.

Hararge and Bale

Killings

OLLAA, in its annual report for last year reported the killing of **Seeyfuddiin Shamshaddiin** on 22 July 2025.⁴⁴ Security forces raided his home in Waltaha Gaba kebele, Deder district, East Hararge. As well as killing Seeyfuddiin they severely beat his wife, Sa’ada.

ONM reported that a border dispute, orchestrated by government agitators, between Afar and Oromo residents at Harooreettii in Gumbi Bordodee district, West Hararge, resulted in the death of **Hasan Sayid Harrichoo** on 7 June.

Also on 7 June, Somali Region forces shot and killed a young herder, **Sheeyidii Maammad Hasan**, in Biyyoo Jannataa kebele, Doba district, West Hararge, and stole the 38 cattle which he was tending. His father, **Mammad Hasan**, was killed in an identical raid in 2025, which was not documented by OSG (ONM).



W1 reported that **Jemal Abdullaa**, a young man from Mata Rammis village, Bedeno district, East Hararge, was killed by government security forces on about 16 June. His body was discovered part way down a cliff face 12 days later (pictured left).

ONM reported on 29 June that soldiers executed two young men, **Aliyyii Abdi** and **Abraahim Saadiq**, in Machara town, Daro Labu district, West Hararge, accusing them of desertion from the army.

⁴³ <https://www.africa-press.net/ethiopia/policy/5-civilians-killed-in-amhara-ethiopia-blames-fano>

⁴⁴ OLLAA Annual Report 2025. <https://ollaa.org/violence-and-impunity-civilian-suffering-in-oromia-ethiopia-2025/>

From the same ONM report, **Aashaa Aliyyii**, the mother of youth Toofiq Mohammed, was shot dead by government militia in Roqaa kebele. The militia members raided their home and attempted to take Toofiq away, presumably for military training. His mother, who also had seven other children, was killed when she threw herself upon him as they were beating him with rifle butts. Toofiq was described as being ‘between life and death’ when he was dragged to the district police station.

Abdela Ahmed and his 7-year old child were killed on 5 July when Somali Region forces attacked and burned Jiru Ifa village in Goro Gutu district, East Hararge (W1). Over 360 villagers were made homeless in the raid (see right).

Also on 5 July, the same forces killed **seven Oromo villagers** and burned down 16 homes in Bibiyo village, Cinaksen district, East Hararge, leaving them homeless and displaced (W1).



Ibrahim Zidan (shown left) was killed by government security forces in Guba Koricha district, West Hararge on 12 July (W1).

Farmer **Abbiyyuu Ahimad Abraahim**, 27-year old father of one, in Guba Koricha district, was detained on 11 July, severely beaten for 24 hours and shot dead on 12 July (ONM).

16-year old **Alii Sayid Alii**, from Gibii village in the same district, was also executed on 12 July after one week’s detention (ONM).



Mohammed Jemal, the young man shown right, was killed by government militia member, Sultan Adem, in Asebot, Miesso district, West Hararge, on or just before 17 July (W1).

Suudi Ahmed, pictured left, was killed by government forces while riding his motorcycle, ‘without any crime,’ in Guba Koricha district, West Hararge, on 19 July (W1).



Kaliilo Bilal (pictured right) was tending cattle in Dalacha district, West Hararge, when government soldiers asked him if he had seen OLA fighters in the area. When he said that he had not, he was accused of lying and shot dead (W1).



On 27 July, two men were killed by government forces in Gursum district, East Hararge. The body shown left is that of **Ibrahim Jibril**. The other victim was named **Husen Umar** (W1).

Bahar Umare, pictured right with his family, from Jarso district, East Hararge, was killed by government forces during the evening of 2 August (W1).





W1 reported on 9 August that **Ramadan Umar** (shown left), a 12th grade student from Gumbi Bordode district, West Hararge, was shot dead by when running away from being forcibly conscripted into ENDF.

ONM reported that 12th grade student, **Sulee Abdi**, from Doba district, West Hararge, was also summarily shot and killed on 6 August for resisting forced conscription.

ISS, OSG's representative in Cairo, reported on 26 August that a young boy, **Jamaal Kaliifaa**, (pictured below right) was shot dead by local policeman, Ahmed Sheikh (shown below centre), at 5.30 pm on 25 August in Tulaa Minoo village, Gola Oda district, East Hararge. ISS was unsure who ordered the killing but named those in the chain of command; village chief, Hayatee Mustafa, district governor, Aliyi

Mohammed Hassan (far left), and his deputy, Dasii Mohammed.



Disappearance

On 24 June, merchant Mahammad Qaadariyaa was taken from a police station in Baddeessa town, Oda Bultum district, West Hararge, to an unknown place. Police refused

to disclose his location to relatives and justified this by claiming he was an OLA spy (ONM).

Other abuses in Hararge zones

The increased incidence of abuses in Eastern Oromia which has been witnessed in recent years has continued, with a large number of reports of detention, physical abuse, extortion, displacement and conscription. The result has been life-threatening destitution for the population.

Detention and beating

In June alone, ONM reported the widespread detention of men, women, youths and even young children, in Meta, Bedeno and Dire Dawa districts of East Hararge. But the most widespread detentions occurred in West Hararge, in ten of its 15 districts; Shanan Dugo, Tulo, Ciro, Boke, Doba, Guba Koricha, Mi'esso, Gumbi Bordode, Daro Labu and Oda Bultum.

Reasons, if any, given for detention were usually accusations of affiliation or family involvement with OLA. The father of two young brothers, Gurmeessaa and Asladdin Aliyyii, who were detained in Boke town, West Hararge, was falsely reported to be a supporter of OLA. Two older sons of his were killed last year by the same paramilitary unit, according to elders reporting to ONM.

Other reasons for detention included failure to pay extortionate taxes (e.g. Meta district), failure to show new, expensive, ID cards (Ciro district and in Furda town, Bedeno district), spurious accusations of selling drugs (Ciro district) and 'because youths had unfamiliar faces' (Boke district).

Dozens of arrests occurred in night raids on communities and were often associated with violence and looting of property from the homes of those detained. Periods of detention were up to several months at least.

In Meta district, Abduramaan Abdallaa Ahimad was so badly beaten in May when he could not respond to extortionate demands for cash that his arms and legs were reportedly broken.

Sharif Kalifa, a farmer caught up in a sweep in Urji Dima and Cora kebeles, Ciro district, in late June, when dozens were detained for failing to pay high fees to obtain digital ID cards, was subjected to a public flogging and had his Short-Wave radio confiscated after being accused of listening to *Oromo National Voice* broadcasts.

The beatings included an assault on Aniisaa Jamaal and all of her three young children in Baddeessa town, Oda Bultum district, causing severe injuries from rifle butts.

Conditions of detention amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. EEPA reported on 6 July that detentions in East Hararge included that of an independent candidate for the House of People's Representatives in the 1 June election, Dr Habtamu Alemu. He was being held in a cell in Dire Dawa measuring only 1m. by 80cm.⁴⁵ He was reported to be 'prohibited from using the toilet.' He was detained because he had complained of irregularities in the election.

Extortion and robbery

As well as detention and threat of detention, physical violence and intimidation at the end of a gun are being used to extort sums of money from residents in East and West Hararge. Districts reported by ONM to be affected in May and June included, in West Hararge; Ciro, Habro, Gumbi Bordode, Shanan Dugo and Oda Bultum districts, and in East Hararge: Meta, Deder, Bedeno and Haramaya districts.

Reasons given for extortion included fines of 500 birr in Ciro district for not voting in the 1 June election; 1,000 birr demanded from residents in Tulo district 'to feed militia'; 200 birr in Ciro to 'support a meeting'; 1,000 birr 'for military support' and 300 birr to 'celebrate the election result' in Bedeno district; fines for building 'illegal constructions' in Deder district; for 'student food' in Habro district; 300 birr for 'road construction' in Meta district; and 500 birr for students to receive certificates for passing secondary school examinations in Meta district. In August, Habro residents were ordered to pay 5,000 birr each for 'water meter change.'

Sometimes no reason was given, as in Meta district in May, where 1,500 birr per household was demanded for no given reason. Payments also included bribes to avoid conscription, as reported from Bedeno district.

Straight forward robbery was also reported, as in Meta district on 30 May, when militia stole food and cash from mourners attending a funeral, or in Tulo district, from where militia sent to 'stabilise the area' took cash and food from residents in early June. Cattle were also reported stolen by militia in Shanan Dugo district.

Large amounts were demanded from land owners. In June, owners of land in Gumbi Bordode district were charged 30-50,000 birr for 'land registration and mapping survey fees' and those unable to pay were made to forfeit half their land.

⁴⁵ <https://www.eepa.be/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-742-6-July-2026.pdf>

Failure to pay resulted in violence or detention as noted above. In cases when large amounts were charged to land-owners, the threat of eviction or land seizure was used. For example, Razzuu Adam Tuulee, was violently expelled from his ancestral land in Meta district in May.

Many households fled from villages in Meta district, such as Hawwii Bilisummaa, Ifa Biiftuu, Bakkalchaa, Wal-tahaa, Dhoqqee 1st, and Dhoqqee 2nd. Women who fled with their families into the bush to avoid the harassment and looting in these villages included Asia Abdullah Musa (mother of 7), Zeyini Abdullah Adamee (mother of 5), and Ashiraqaa Ahimad Musa (mother of 4).

Saddoo kebele in Meta district became an open-air interrogation centre in June, when cadres picked out families of Oromo nationalists among the assembled villagers and threatened them with eviction if their children did not return from the forest. Extra militia were deployed to extort an arbitrary tax of 8,700 birr per person, in addition to 2,000 birr for ‘road improvement.’

Economic damage

Commerce is being severely inhibited by arbitrary taxes and levies. For example, in Oda Bultum district, the revenue office in Baddeessa town is charging 500 birr for every ox and 400 birr for every sheep taken from rural areas to the market.

Owners of small businesses are being heavily taxed. Up to 50,000 birr has been demanded from small business owners and shopkeepers in Awaday town, Haramaya district, as a ‘defence war tax.’ Sports coaches running youth programmes in Habro district have been charged 25,000 birr. Owners of small marketplace kiosks and food stalls in Ciro district were ordered to pay a quarterly tax of 6,000 birr. Detention and withdrawal of business licences have been threatened for those unable or unwilling to pay.

Travelers in Ciro district are being robbed by police and soldiers at road blocks. Passengers are taken from buses, beaten and detained if they don’t hand over cash. Motorcyclists, bajaj drivers and freight drivers are routinely charged 500-1,000 birr, reducing the local availability of goods.

Other abuses in Bale

There were two reports of other abuses in Bale from ONM in mid-June: extortion of money and theft of livestock by government militia in Dinsho district, and using community meetings in Gasara and Agarfa districts to terrorise and threaten the population against supporting OLA.

Corruption affecting water supply and healthcare

Party officials in the districts of Daro Labu (West Hararge), Mayu Muluqe and Kombolcha (East Hararge) have pocketed the money taken from communities to improve the supply of clean water and there is, therefore, a severe shortage (ONM, 5-10 June).

A critical shortage of drinking water in Dire Dawa, East Hararge, reported by *Borkena* on 28 June,⁴⁶ was blamed by government officials on water pumps being damaged by strong winds and power outages. Hotels were paying 5,000 birr for water tankers, which lasted under two days.

Mismanagement in Kombolcha district and embezzlement in Oda Bultum district of West Hararge have resulted in lack of basic healthcare. The administrator of Baddeessa hospital in Oda Bultum district, Abdulwuhaab Orgobbaa, was accused by ONM of siphoning off

⁴⁶ <https://borkena.com/news-dire-dawa-faces-critical-drinking-water-shortage-amid-rising-temperatures/>

medical supplies and equipment to private clinics, for his own personal benefit, resulting in the inadequate attention to birth complications for five mothers named by ONM on 25 June.

Forced conscription

Widespread forced conscription has continued across the region. In June alone, ONM reported youths being press-ganged in Tulo, Shanan Dugo, Ciro and Oda Bultum districts of West Hararge and in Bedeno and Goro Muxi districts of East Hararge.

ONM reported dozens of youngsters were being rounded up from villages and Waldaya town in Shanan Dugo district in July.

On 5 August, 14-year old youths Bishri Mohammed, Yasin Kamali and Mirqansa were detained in Malka Balo district, West Hararge, for refusing conscription (ONM).

Three more youngsters were ‘taken for war’ on 1 September in West Hararge: Aliyi Daru Mohamed Usman and Ziad Awal (W1).

Youths were rounded up *en masse* from their homes, including those who were under age and infirm. They have been snatched in large numbers from their fields and when travelling on public transport and taken away in large trucks. Residents in Oda Bultum district have been gathered in public meetings and ordered to give one child per family for military training.

Others, mostly older and less able men, have been forced to act as guards for local militia in Shanan Dugo and Goro Muxi districts. In Yaaddoo Bobbaasaa kebele, Ciro district, local farmers have been forced to stand guard overnight around military camps and transport corridors, without payment or protection against freezing conditions.

The collection of money as bribes for families to avoid the conscription of their children was reported from Goro Wado village, Bedeno district, where the gift of ‘one sheep per group’ was also accepted in place of cash. Exorbitant exemption fees were reportedly charged in Oda Bultum district.

Displacement and dispossession of land in Hararge and Bale

East Hararge

ONM reported in June that government cadres forced residents from their homes in Saddoo kebele, Meta district, and gathered them together. They singled out families of Oromo nationalists and ordered them to bring their children ‘out of the forest’ or face eviction from the village. Administrators warned the community that they would be held collectively liable for any military actions nearby.

IDPs in East Bale and Bale

Over 5,000 internally displaced Oromo who had settled in Gobu kebele, Goro district, East Bale, after fleeing from other parts of Oromia Region, were reported by ONM on 28 June to have been again uprooted. Local government cadres were taking away by force the land which they were cultivating and handing it over to non-local ‘pro-regime loyalists.’ Those who protested were beaten, accused of being OLA supporters and detained.

On 14 July, former OFC politician and detainee Jawar Mohammed posted a 2 minute 50 second video on Facebook showing three farmers speaking to camera,⁴⁷ complaining that they represented eight families in Hanbala kebele, Barbare district, Bale zone, whose land

⁴⁷<https://www.facebook.com/bhasoba/posts/pfbid02LCm8pWZKYjC9Ywq6oLMW3CQXFjPodKokH7Fny5WoHDpV8Gvnn6HxEAhCGhdkXGRSI>

was being given to outside investors, and asking for recognition and assistance. Images from the video are shown below.



Horo Guduru and East Wallega

To avoid unnecessary repetition, unless specified otherwise, the districts which are referred to below belong to East Wallega zone. Killings of innocent, unarmed civilians by government forces and by Fano militants are separated below. Other abuses are documented chronologically, whether perpetrated by government or Fano forces.

Killings by government security forces

An 8-year old child, **Siqahee Abdallaa Abraham**, was killed and two other children wounded in Kenafi kebele, Guto Gida district, on 30 May when government forces attacked with tanks, field guns and ZU-23 anti-aircraft weapons aimed directly into the civilian community. Siqahee died instantly. Siqahee's sibling Qamaree Abdallaa Abraham, aged 12, and Bontu Sultan Abraham, aged 15, suffered critical blast injuries (ONM). Other related attacks with heavy weapons are reported below.

Two farmers who had been forcibly conscripted into local militia were shot dead by their commanders in Jireen kebele, Nunnu Qumba district, on 3 June, when they attempted to desert, escape the military camp and return to their farms and families (ONM).

Disputes over loot and ethnic divisions reportedly led to fighting between two government militia factions in Gida Ayana and KIRAMU districts on 13 June. A **battalion commander** was killed and others deserted following the fray (ONM).

Another reluctant **militia member** was shot dead by fellow militia members near Sombo Church in Aniso kebele, Ebantu district, on 24 June when attempting to desert and join OLA, as one of his colleagues had done a few days earlier (ONM).

A farmer and father, **Daraje Soori**, was killed by soldiers who surrounded his home in Gamo Nagaro, Jimma Ganati district, Horo Guduru, in late June. His brother, Fiqadu Soori, was taken into detention. Both were falsely accused of working for OLA (ONM).

Moti Naga and **Ashenafi Kebede** were shot dead while on their way to church on 28 June in Sibu Sire district (W1).

Government forces shot dead **Daniel Amanu** in Fayyine kebele, in the Laga Harree area of Guto Gida district, in the early evening of 3 July. He was falsely accused of working with OLA (ONM).

Lemma Warquu, farmer and father of seven (shown right), was taken from his home in Kalala village, Haro Limu district, by government forces late on 7 July. He was made to walk for two hours to his farmland in Shonkora village (Buttujji area) and killed there early on 8 July. He was falsely accused of having ties with OLA. W1 and ONM both reported the incident.



Father of four, **Fikadu Sambato** (pictured left), of Kenafi village, Guto Gida district, was killed by government security forces on 30 July. The innocent farmer was accused of having ties with OLA, which was untrue (W1).



Four young men were taken from their homes in Nunnu Qumbi district and detained in Adaree town on 6 August. Two days later, **Damee Ayyalaa**, **Biqilaa Imaanaa**, **Asiraaroo Naasiroo**, and **Abdiisaa Taammiruu**, were taken to the village of Birinqaas and executed together in a single location (ONM).

Killings by Fano

There were two mass killings by Fano in June/July, leaving at least 28 civilians dead, and at least four more in late July/early August. A more devastating attack, killing numerous civilians and damaging infrastructure in Gida Ayana district, occurred on 19 August.

The first attack was in and around Agamsa town in Amuru district, Horo Guduru, beginning on 30 June and including the early hours of 1 July.



W1 first reported that **12 were killed** and supplied nine names, a number of photographs

(shown right) and a video which had been uploaded to Facebook showing 100 or more fleeing from Agamsa town,⁴⁸ two images from which are shown above left. The fleeing crowd can be seen carrying at least one body.



Youngsters listed as killed on 30 June were named by W1 as **Degefa Qorcoo**, **Dinqaa Abdiisaa**, **Feredaa Takkalaa**, **Amoo Regassaa**, **Jaarsoo Gufee**, **Jireenyaa Xiyyaar**, **Miss Dhibbashee Girma**, **Faradaa Hailu** and **Kitile Eticha**.

W1 reported next day that more had been killed and wounded during a continued assault beginning at 5.00 a.m. on 1 July, when he sent the following photographs, one of which carries a name not in the original list – **Bayissa Alemu Buli** (right image at top of next page).

⁴⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1392111686175261>



Borkena reported on 2 July that at least 13 had been killed.⁴⁹ Both W1 and *Borkena* stated that a number of cattle had been taken by Fano during the attack.

The *Borkena* article stated that Fano members had pillaged Agamsa town. Agamsa was the site of a previous massacre by Fano, when at least 63 Oromo were killed on 30 August 2022.⁵⁰ A misleading report from the Amhara Association of America claimed the victims were Amhara citizens killed by OLA but a detailed report by residents of the town demonstrated the culpability of Amhara Fano militia.⁵¹

The second recent major Fano attack was on a crowd gathered for a football tournament at which twelve district teams were playing in Hanger Gutin (a town and valley in Gida Ayana district), East Wallega, on 24 July. More than eleven were killed, according to W1.



Five were killed in one vehicle, the burnt out remains are shown above right. They were named as three brothers – **Jooni, Diriba and Fikadu Dhuguma** and two young women, **Xurre Bayana and Imire Salbane**.



The dead included a local **militia member** and a **policeman** (pictured above left) and sports commentator, **Dechasa Genet** (shown with microphone, right).



Other victims named by W1 were **Gutema Wakjira, Gari Atomsa, and Wakene Jibril**, but he was unable to obtain the names of all of those killed. Five of the victims are pictured left and above.

⁴⁹ <https://borkena.com/2026/07/02/ethiopia-at-least-13-civilians-killed-in-horo-guduru-as-government-links-attack-to-tsimdo/>

⁵⁰ <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Press-Release-8-September-2022.pdf>

⁵¹ <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/The-facts-behind-the-Agamsa-massacre-30-August-2022.pdf>

The International Oromo Women's Organization, in an appeal posted on Facebook and published by *Advocacy for Oromia*,⁵² provided more information gained from contacts in the area. Their report corroborated the killing of the three Dhuguma brothers (naming Diriba as Jake Dhuguma) and listed other fatalities as **Qana'a Galata**, **Sadene Jundi**, **Motuma Reta**, **Takale Gamachu** and **Yeenus Buli**. Therefore at least 16 are named among those killed. A large funeral procession for the victims is shown below.



W1 reported four other killings by Fano militia in late July and early August. An elderly man, **Gemechu Fayisa**, in Qoqoffee kebele, KIRAMU district, was killed on 30 July. His funeral procession is pictured right.



On 10 August, three more civilians were killed in Lomica village, Abee Dongoroo district, Horo Guduru zone, by Fano militia. Only their first names were available to W1. These were **Goraashii**, **Qansii** and **Gudeta**.

Abee Dongoroo district was the scene of gruesome butchery by Fano at the beginning of March, when at least 50 unarmed villagers, including an infant, several women, elderly and infirm individuals were killed (OSG Report 73, pp.40-43).⁵³



There was another and more devastating spate of killings by Fano on 19 August in Gida Ayana district. The first reported fatality in this attack was lorry driver **Amo Dhufa** (shown left), who was murdered in the Dichu mountain area. (It was on this road that Fano militants killed 31-34 Oromo bus passengers on 15 September 2023).⁵⁴



Most of the killings on 19 August occurred when Fano went on the rampage, burning and killing in Tulu Leenca, (Leenca mountain – a kebele and rural area in Gida Ayana district). W1 and the International Oromo Women's Organization (IOWO) named **eleven more victims**, including prominent professionals. All but two were named by both W1 and IOWO.

They included the Bank Manager of Awash bank, **Lami Mengistu** (above right), named Lamessa Mengistu by IOWO; **Mamush Maru** (right) an employee of the Cooperative Bank of Oromia; and



⁵² <https://advocacy4oromia.org/2026/08/24/slaughter-in-the-shadows-the-unfolding-horror-in-east-wollega/>

⁵³ <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-73-12-June-2026.pdf>

⁵⁴ OSG Report 64, pp.17-21, <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-64.pdf>; An account of Fano atrocities up to October 2024 is given on pp.3-6 of OSG Report 67, <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-67.pdf>

teacher **Olika Sagni** (right). **Olika's mother** was murdered by Fano one week previously, according to W1.

Sister **Likkitu Amanu**, a midwife at Gida Ayana District Hospital (below left) was burned to death in her vehicle according to IOWO; **Chala Negasa** (below centre) was a recent graduate at Bahar Dar university, and **Zakir Ahmed** (below right) was a driver.



Amanu Hirpha Bidu (below left) was reported by IOWO to have been burned to death when being carried in an ambulance. **Kafale Nagasa** (below centre left) was named by both sources but it was not stated if he was a brother of recent graduate Chala Nagasa. **Alamayo Desale** (below centre) was reported killed by IOWO but was reported severely wounded by W1.

The other named victim was **Amanuel Dhufera Seda** (not pictured) who was also killed while being transported in an ambulance. He was being taken to Nekemte city. He and Amanu Hirpha Bidu were the only victims on 19 August who were not named by W1 as well as IOWO. The two other images are of Fano militants in Tulu Leenca, the first showing a burning vehicle.



On the evening of 19 August, several hundred young Oromo demonstrated on the streets of Gida Ayana town in protest against the killings. The images below were taken from three Facebook posts of the demonstration.⁵⁵



⁵⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/reel/4402286100101282>; <https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1D88AzLA2o/> and <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1741120073757696>

W1 reported on 20 August that **about 27 had been killed** by Fano and 11 vehicles destroyed by fire in this latest upsurge in violence.



The violence is continuing. On 2 September, **Elias Indashew** (far left), a young man living in Qoqoffee, was killed by Fano Amhara militia (W1).

W1 reported on 4 September that the Director of Qoqoffee High School, Fikadu Nega (near left), had been arrested and detained in Kिरamu prison.

The ease with which Fano forces move among Oromo communities, committing atrocities on

Oromo people without any response from national or regional government forces, and the detention of Oromo by government security personnel at the same time in the same district, indicate there is communication and cooperation between Fano in Wollo, Showa and Wallega and regional and federal government forces; despite the battles between Fano and ENDF in Amhara Region.

Kidnap for ransom



W1 and ONM both reported the kidnapping for ransom of 13-year old Lalisa Marga (shown left) from Goro Obora kebele, Gida Ayana district, on 4 July. Fano militia took the boy to an unknown location and demanded two million birr for his release.

A young woman, Robe Bekele (right), was abducted by Fano forces from Gida Ayana district on the day of the violence in Tulu Leenca or the day after, according to W1, writing on 24 August. Her family was ordered to pay two million birr to secure her release.



Adugna Desalegn (right), a schoolteacher in Jimma for many years, was abducted by Fano on 27 August when on his way to visit his family in Kिरamu district. The insurgents demanded 400,000 birr for his release.

Eviction and displacement: ethnic cleansing

Unarmed Oromo villagers are being displaced by Amhara settlers in districts of Horo Guduru and East Wallega. Government security forces and heavily armed Fano militia are cooperating in attacking towns and villages and clearing them of their Oromo residents, stealing their cattle and destroying their homes and crops.



In the first week of June, over 100 families were evicted by government forces from their properties in Nashee 02 kebele, Agamsa district, Horo Guduru. They were accused of having links to OLA. ONM reported that they fled to Saqalaa town, Horo Bulluq district, where they were homeless, while 30 other farmers were detained in the district police station.

On 5 June, two elderly women, mother of seven Tuunee Tawaddee and mother of three Balaayi Deessisaa, in Tibbee Haraa kebele, Gobu Sayo district, East Wallega, were evicted from their homes and land. They fled to Bako town, where ONM reported they were homeless and living on the streets. They were told that this happened because their husbands were Oromo nationalists.

Government forces beat and evicted Oromo residents from their land in Wayu Tuqa district, East Wallega, and began settling Amhara migrants on their choice farmland in Miinyaa Kuraa kebele on 9 June. Oromo farmers were branded OLA collaborators and charged extortionate amounts to recover their seized cattle (ONM).

In East Wallega, on 17 June, government forces shot and killed livestock belonging to three farmers in Gudaya Bila district, and were reported to be preventing farmers using their land in Jimma Arjo district in the following week (ONM).

A large contingent of ENDF soldiers entered Birinqaa kebele, Nunnu Qumba, in the last week of June, with the intention of conscripting farmers while working in their fields. However, the community had fled into the surrounding dense bush to avoid the press gangs. The soldiers responded by launching a barrage with heavy weapon into the farmers' fields, causing them to abandon the village. ONM reported that hundreds of families were displaced from their ancestral land and were stranded in the forest without access to food, clean water or shelter.

On 9 July, ONM warned that Fano forces were again looting and displacing Oromo communities in East Wallega and Horo Guduru.

On 13 August, two Facebook posts showed Fano taking cattle and forcing 100 or more people from Qoqoffee town in Kिरामु district, East Wallega.

The first post, forwarded by W1, is composed of two recordings which last 39 seconds in total.⁵⁶ Initial shots are of uniformed men waking briskly through a town with what appears to be a burning building in the distance. Civilians are walking quickly in front of them. This is followed by scenes of people walking hurriedly along a road. Two are being carried on stretchers.

Images from the first post are shown below:



⁵⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1727499541636471>

The second post is a composite of five clips lasting 2 minutes 11 seconds in total.⁵⁷ The first section is of 100 or more stolen cattle, with an Amharic commentary. This is followed by cattle and people moving quickly along the same thoroughfare as in the first video, with women carrying infants looking anxiously behind them, followed by the same clip as shown above. Armed men are then seen firing a large machine gun mounted on a tripod before the video ends with 12 or more men in civilian clothes, beating down a mature crop (see below).



This is clear evidence of ethnic cleansing.

The final image, left, is of a woman leading an ox loaded with her household goods and two young children on the road out of Qoqoffee, sent by W1.

Sexual violence

The Kenafi kebele administrator in Guto Gida district, named Chuuchuu, was reported by ONM on 31 May to be demanding sexual favours from primary school teachers in return for them not being accused of having links to OLA. Many teachers had abandoned their posts because of his harassment.

Artillery attacks and injury

An attack by mortars and Dishka artillery was reported to have taken place in Guto Gida district on 14 May, which seriously wounded a 14-year old girl (ONM).

As well as the artillery attack on civilians in Kenafi kebele, Guto Gida district, which killed one child and injured two others on 30 May (see Killings, above), government forces fired heavy weapons into civilian areas in Ukkee town in the district on 29 May. ONM wrote that the attacks were in response to OLA activity in the area.

Disappearance

Disappearances by government and Fano forces were reported. It is likely that the victims named below have been killed.

⁵⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/reel/27720752237582081>

Abraham Sambato was taken to an unknown location by government security forces from kebele 03, Nekemte city, in early July, accused of having links to OLA (ONM).

School headmaster, Diribaa Ulfaataa, was taken from Galila town and detained in Limu district police station where he was mistreated for two months before being made to disappear on 9 July. Limu district officials claimed to have no knowledge of his whereabouts thereafter (ONM).

Two farmers were detained by government forces in Lugo kebele, Wayu Tuqa district, when Fano militia attacked the government soldiers who were holding them and took them away on 29 July. They were named Ziyadu Jamal (aged 60) and Alii Abdii Ahimadee (ONM).

Detention and beating

OSG received 35 reports of detention and/or beating between 18 May and 12 July; 16 in Horo Guduru and 19 in East Wallega. There were 27 incidents reported in June alone. A late report, on 17 August from W1, included four detained the previous day in Bila district, East Wallega, a 12th grade student, 19-year old Lalisa Waji, and three farmers, including elderly Mako Kajela, Ayana Duresa and one other.

Four reports referred to beating alone and one to the severe beating of Nagaroo Salbaanee, from Gobu in Gida Ayana district who was detained on 30 June for just one night by militia in a military camp, badly beaten and dumped unconscious on the roadside next morning – forbidden from seeking medical assistance.

The accounts of beating without detention included young men in Wayu town, Jimma Raree district, for having long braided hair (resembling OLA fighters), which was forcibly shaved off (reported 12 June); school students beaten on their way to school to sit exams in Gudaya Bila district on 19 June; and the beating by Fano militia of a youth in Gida Ayana district on 30 July. Bayisa Dhereesaa was beaten so severely by Fano in Sirba Waddeessaa that ONM described him as being ‘between life and death.’

The fourth report of beating without detention concerned the gangster ‘120’ group, who operate with government approval over an increasing distance from their beginnings in West Showa. They severely beat and robbed minibus driver Garoma Jaldy in Nekemte city on 12 July.

The other reports were of detention, which often included accounts of beating during and after arrest.

From Horo Guduru, there were four reports from Ababo Guduru district and one or two reports from the districts of Amuru, Guduru, Horo, Horo Bulluq, Jardega Jarte, Jimma Ganate, Jimma Raree, Sulula Fincha and Shambu city.

Within East Wallega, there were four reports from Haro Limu district, three from Nekemte city and Nunnu Qumba district and one or two from the districts of Guto Gida, Digga, Sibbu Sire, Gudaya Bila, Jimma Arjo, Sasiga and Gida Ayana.

Most of the reports were of small numbers of people named by ONM (two by W1) but some were of large numbers; for example, hundreds of young men taken from the streets of



Teacher, Director of Haro Limu Secondary School, Diriba Ulfata, detained 11 July (W1).

Nekemte city who had been detained without charge for 8-9 months by 22 May; more than 100 in Jimma Arjo district in June, large numbers, including a youth, Bal'ina Sixoota, and a young woman, Tsaayee Daggafaa, taken during a sweep of civilians in Oda Gudina kebele, Digga district on 26 May 'without a legal cause;' and 'a large number' detained in Guto Gida district in May, including eight named by ONM.

As well as farmers and young men who were accused of supporting OLA in some way – acting as guides, spies or for no specified reason – mothers and young women were accused of providing information, food and drink to OLA fighters.

One of the most common reasons given for the detention of women, for example in early-mid June, Balaaynesh Taaddasaa, Goban town, Jimma Raree district, and mother of seven, Biraane Toolassa, Gudaya Bila district, is that their husbands or children had joined OLA.

Two, in Limmu and Sulula Finca'a districts were reportedly detained for not supporting the Prosperity Party in the June election, although ONM reported that one of these, Ms Dammee Amasiisaa, in Sulula Finca'a, was the victim of personal malice by regime loyalist Bethlehem Alamayo.

Less common justifications for detention were being blamed for a fellow soldier's desertion from ENDF (Ibsa Fiqaaduu, Horo district) and supplying medicines to OLA (health workers Tamsgeen Bayana, Haro Limmu district, and Falmata Jireenya Namara, Nunnu Qumba district).

Many detainees had a family history of being abused previously. In Guto Gida district, Shumate Xilahun, mother of two, had been widowed five months previously when her husband was shot dead, and, farmer Addunyaa Waaqtolee, was abducted when herding his cattle on 27 May, six months after being detained and tortured in Nekemte city police station.

Whole families were sometimes detained, as in Horo Bulluq district, where a family of three were imprisoned for alleged ties with OLA on 27 May.

Children were among those detained, such as Marama Fayissa, a schoolboy taken from Saggoo and held in a high security cell in Jardega Jaarte district prison (reported 29 June).

Secondary school students were taken from the street when on their way to sit exams and detained, missing grade and university entrance exams (e.g. brothers Lalisa and Garoma Lammessa, Nekemte).

Detainees were often described as being ill, abused by prison guards and denied medical care for several months in detention; for example Mallasee Guddataa Ayyaansaa, in Haro Limmu district, and many, including four named by ONM, suffering lack of food and water, and from physical and mental illness in Daduu town police station, Ababo Guduru district.

One result of detention which is rarely mentioned is the destitution of families whose breadwinners are detained. Family members of at least one detainee, Badhaasaa Fayisaa, were also physically prevented from tending their land in Horo district at the end of June.

Increasingly common in recent months have been reports of Prosperity Party forces and cadres turning on each other. On 30 May, top officials in Sibu Sire district were imprisoned: District Security Bureau head, Guluma Hordofa; Head of the Organising Bureau, Addisuu Tasfaye; District Police Commissioner, Commander Tasfa Jalata; and the Head of Youth League, named Hamdee.

On 4 June, Takilee Fiixaa, a high-ranking Prosperity Party official in Jimma Arjo district was detained by colleagues in kebele 02, charged with supporting OLA. Two days later, ten

Prosperity Party militia members in Nunnu Qumba district were detained because they challenged the party's actions and were branded as OLA supporters.

Over 40 civil servants in Ababo Guduru district were reported on 15 July to have been held without charge for five months for using mobile phones to receive salaries when OLA were in the area previously.

Extortion, theft, coercion and corruption

Within a five-week period, from 25 May to 30 June, 13 examples of crippling extortion and theft by government forces from the impoverished population were reported from Horo Bulluq, Jardega Jarte, Jimma Ganate and Jimma Raree districts in Horo Guduru and Bilo Boshe, Wayu Tuqa, Guto Gida, Gida Ayana and Jimma Arjo districts and Nekemte city in East Wallega. Two other reports were later received; from Ebantu district, East Wallega, in July and one more from Gida Ayana on 11 August.

Relatively small sums demanded included 700 birr 'for digital registration fees' in Wayu Tuqa and Guto Gida districts. Those who were unable to pay were barred from accessing fertiliser distributed by the government.

Villagers in Jimma Arjo district were charged 1,500 birr for 'militia logistics support' in addition to 1,000 birr for 'school funding' taken in house-to-house visits by armed militia, and more for ID card renewal. Receipts were issued and anyone attempting to travel on public transport who was unable to produce these on demand was detained as an 'insurgent collaborator.'

Extortion also included demands for food for militia members in Jimma Arjo district and for officials attending the June election in Bilo Boshe district.

Two forms of bribery were reported. In kebeles in Bilo Boshe, youngsters were gathered together and offered (in vain) large cash loans for assisting in 'local security operations' while party officials were reported taking bribes for allowing Jimma Arjo residents to repair their roofs with zinc sheets. They were also fining farmers 6,000 birr for trying to transfer land titles.

Larger sums were demanded from business owners and town dwellers as taxes or for defence purposes in Guto Gida, Jimma Raree and Jimma Ganate districts. Party agents took 11,800 birr from two residents of Horo Alaltu town and 38,000 birr from another for 'firearms to defend the town against Fano and OLA' in May. When the weapons did not materialise, requests for their money to be returned were met with only threats and intimidation.

Large sums were taken from at least 15 civilians in Abbay Comman district in June. Truck owners were charged 40,000 birr at checkpoints between Nekemte and the capital and the same amount, 40,000 birr, was demanded per household in Jimma Raree and Jimma Ganate districts 'for ammunition fees.' Dissenting families were threatened with eviction.

Between 20,000 and 100,000 birr in arbitrary taxes was demanded by militia in Gida Ayana district in August. One trader in Ayana town reported to ONM that the taxes exceeded the value of his entire stock.

Theft and extortion were not limited to cash. Three farmers in Horo Bulluq, between them, had three oxen and 35 sheep taken by government forces in June. Local cadres and militia stole 17 cattle, worth one million birr, from Kiisii Ittaanaa in Jardega Jaarte district. Three years previously, 20 cattle, 34 sheep and three million birr were stolen from his father. Their grain store was destroyed, his father killed and his home was burned down.

Destruction of school property when it was turned into a military camp in Gudaya Bila district; the banning of motorcycle transport between Jireenya kebele, Guto Gida district, and Nekemte, in retaliation for the OLA road blockade at the beginning of June; and the cutting off of electricity to Qello town, Ebantu district in July, stopping the grain mill from working and preventing all mobile phone charging; all of these contributed to the degradation of infrastructure and commercial activity throughout East Wallega zone.

Forced conscription

Forced conscription has been reported ‘from almost every district across Oromia’ and was specifically recorded by ONM from Guto Gida district in June, Nunnu Qumba and Digga districts in July and by W1 in Sibu Sire district on 17 August.

Qellem and West Wallega, Illubabor, Buno Bedele, Jimma

Killings

The killing of farmer **Khalid Harun Gorba** and the wounding of two others in Begi district, West Wallega, on 14 May was briefly reported in OSG Report 73 (p.54). Further details of the attack were published by ONM a few days later. Khalid was working in his fields in Dhallaadduu Dhagaa Bokaa village when approached by party official Mohammed Nur Bandu, accompanied by armed militia, at about 4.30 p.m. The official ordered the farmers to attend a Prosperity Party election rally. When the farmers asked to finish their work before attending the rally, Khalid was shot dead and two other farmers, Ramadallaa Iidee Yaasi and Raamatalla Jalduu Callaa, were critically injured and taken to Begi hospital.

Mr Kasahun, Wandu Kasahun, and Sultan Kadir were reported by ONM on 20 May to have been killed in Muggi town area, Qellem, accused of being ‘anti-government.’

Xaaso Baqqala Gurmu, a 70-year old in Addis Hiwot, Nejo district, West Wallega, was reported by ONM on 15 May to have been beaten to death by ‘affiliates of the Prosperity Party.’ The nearby home of his brother, Gamada Baqqala Gurmu, was attacked with hand grenades and burned down. Gamada was critically injured.

A respected head of a family in Dalla village, Anfilo district, Qellem, **Ashannafi Dingataa**, was reported on 16 May by ONM to have been executed by government militia during routine ‘election security operations.’

On 27 May, youth **Awal Kadir**, in Yaanfaa town area of Boracha district, Buno Bedele, was shot dead in front of his mother by government forces, accused of supporting OLA (ONM).

A police officer named **Hariiroo** was taken to the local police station on 29 May after an OLA action in Harawe kebele in Mana Sibu district, West Wallega. He was accused of collaborating with the rebel force. After a few hours, he was taken to the nearby military camp and shot dead by the military commander (ONM).

Saamu'eel Shaamoo was shot and killed in front of his family and neighbours in Lalisaa Ganjii kebele, Ganji district, on 30 May. He and his friend, another youth, named Saamu'eel Asaffaa, were returning home after bathing in a local river. His friend was abducted by the same soldiers who killed Saamu'eel. ONM reported that neither of the youngsters had any connections to any political organisation.

A young man named **Biraanuu** (father's name not known) in Homa town, Homa district, was killed by government forces in the first week of June (ONM). He was falsely accused of passing logistics information to OLA.

The West Wallega Human Rights Defenders group, which has collated and sent reports on abuses dating back to 2018 in eight reports which have been sent since April 2021,⁵⁸ sent a report in August which included two killings in Guliso district in June. **Mitiku Chali**, a 35-year old married man from Sanki Dano kebele, was killed by security forces on 1 June. **Ashenafi Abaje**, aged 30, was an ENDF soldier who was killed when trying to desert from Chalia military camp on 12 June. An edited version of the Defenders group report will shortly be posted on the [reports section](#) of the OSG website and is appended to this report.

Amaanu'eel Taadiyoos, a young man in Anfilo district, Qellem, was shot dead in his home by government forces on 16 June (ONM).

An innocent young man named **Eliyas** was shot many times, killed and his body left in a field: and an elderly woman, Qulluccee Tarrafaa, was seriously wounded when security forces raided Jawi Koboshee kebele, Yubdo district, West Wallega, on 21 June (ONM). Qulluccee was taken to Aira hospital. They were accused of supporting OLA.

ONM reported that **Maatiyoos Sambatoo**, a youth from Bukko Assabi, Gimbi district, West Wallega, was tortured with plastic bags melted onto his body at the Thursday market, (probably 25 June,) before being shot dead by government security forces, for no apparent reason. ONM stated he was not involved with politics.

A 14-year old girl (pictured right), named **Sutume Kenea** by W1, from Kiltu Kancare village, Sayo Nole district, West Wallega, was killed by government forces on 25 June. ONM named her as Sutume Idosa Xiqi, and reported that she was killed on 21 June, when she was unable to lead soldiers to OLA positions. She was herding cattle and was obviously mentally disabled but was nonetheless summarily shot dead.



On 23 June, a respected farmer and peace advocate, **Duulaa Sirriiqaa**, in Kutala Kusi kebele, Babo Gambel district, West Wallega, was dragged from his home and shot dead by security forces, claiming his son was a member of OLA (ONM).

On 25 June, ONM wrote that a bodyguard to a top commander in Haru district, West Wallega, had committed suicide in protest at civilian killings by the army. **Abdi** (father's name unknown) who originated in Qellem, had attempted in vain to leave the force. He turned his weapon on himself in Warra Danya, Tokkuma Congee kebele.



W1 reported that **Galata Ababe** (shown left), from Oda Abono village, Sayo Nole district, West Wallega, was killed by government forces on 25 June. ONM reported that he and another young man, **Abduu Fufaa Naadoo**, were killed 'at their workplace' on 21 June. They were accused of being supporters of OLA.

W1 and ONM reported the killing of locally respected father of two **Matiwos Sambata**

Hararu (pictured right) by government forces at Geda Kamisa in Buko kebele, Lalo Asebi district, West Wallega, on 26 June. He was taken from his home and executed at the central market place



⁵⁸ The first report from this group was published on the OSG website at https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Violations-in-West-Oromia_-Abuses-in-five-districts-October-2018-April-2021-2.pdf and was included in OSG Report 56. Their second and third reports were incorporated in [Reports 58](#) and [59](#). Subsequent reports on the OSG website were [April 2022](#), [May 2023](#), [February 2024](#) and [July 2024](#). These 4th to 7th reports are summarised in OSG Reports [60](#), [63](#), [65](#) and [67](#), respectively.

in front of hundreds of shoppers. Friends and neighbours were forbidden from taking his body for burial.

On 27 June, ONM reported that a notorious local militia chief, Yaadasaa Haroo, who had executed an innocent youth, **Kumaa Efireem Abdiisaa** ‘in broad daylight’ in Mandi town, West Wallega, was temporarily removed from his post while under investigation for the killing. He was reinstated just prior to the report.

A 50-year old farmer, father of three, **Sambataa Jaallataa**, in Garbi Arba, Haru district, West Wallega, was executed on 2 July because he refused to serve as a militia member (ONM).

On 3 July, **two young men and one older Oromo man**, two of whom were named **Ali Jibril** and **Said Ahmed**, were killed by government forces in Bena village, Darimu district, Illubabor. Soldiers stole their 14 cattle. They had moved from East Hararge about 20 years ago to find farm land (W1).



Three more killings in Illubabor were reported by W1 in the following two weeks. In Dabo Hana district, father of four, **Aliyi Usmael**, and another civilian, **Getacho Daka**, were killed on 6 July.

Keradin Garamu (pictured above right), a young farmer in Bilo Nopha district, was arrested by police and killed on 15 July.



Young veterinary doctor, **Hamza Musa** (shown left), was killed on 29 July in Qarbacho village, Begi district, West Wallega (W1).

Merera Girma (pictured right) was killed in front of his family in Yemalogi Walal district, Qellem, on 31 July (W1).



Yadesa Lijalem (left), from Inango Siba Garjo, was killed in Meka, Nejo district, West Wallega, on or just before 7 August (W1).



The West Wallega Human Rights Defenders group (see below, pp.69 *et seq.*) reported the execution of another **deserting soldier** in early August. The soldier escaped from Chalia military camp but was caught in Nekemte, East Wallega. He was returned to Chalia camp where he was executed by the camp commander.

On an unspecified date in August, **Tesfaye Teshome** was shot and killed in Sayo Nole district, West Wallega, when he intervened to protect a woman from sexual assault by a soldier (ONM).

Abdii Isa (right) from Aira district, West Wallega, was murdered by government forces on 30 August (W1).

Sexual violence

At about 9.00 p.m. on 16 May in Haru district, West Wallega, government soldiers abducted two young women from their family home in Qakkii Adaree kebele and took them to a forest area called Gaddii, where they were gang-raped by 11 soldiers until 4.00 a.m. next morning. They were then taken to the military camp in Haru town, where they were denied medical care (ONM).



A 12th grade school student, named by ONM, was abducted at gunpoint in Wadaboo kebele, Gimbi district, on 20 May and subjected to sexual exploitation.

On 22 May, soldiers abducted a girl on her way home from school in Warqa Waddeessaa kebele, Gimbi district. The 4th grade student was named by ONM. She was taken to a military camp where she was married against her will to a 'Prosperity Party militant.'

Injured

Several serious injuries from shooting and one of a child from being struck by a military vehicle were recorded. On 28 May, soldiers shot 6th grade student Hamza Abdulkarim in his leg and severely beat his mother, breaking her arm, in Eegoo Girmoos kebele, Begi District (ONM). They were accused of having links to OLA.

On 2 June, youth Tsaggaa'ee Sambatoo Itayyaa, was taken from his home in Sanaagaa kebele, Sayo district, Qellem, and was being marched to a military camp when he attempted to run away. He was shot with two bullets and critically injured (ONM).

A young girl, Ilillii Maarqos Gurmuu, was hit by a military vehicle, from Begi district, being driven at high speed through the Tele area of Qilxu Kara district, West Wallega, on 10 June. She was still unconscious when the incident was reported two days later. ONM reported that many injuries to children resulted from military vehicle being driven recklessly.

W1 forwarded a Facebook post by Jawar Mohammed on 10 August,⁵⁹ which shows about 40-50 people hurrying away from gunshots in Chando kebele, Gumma district, Jimma. Members of the wailing crowd are shown carrying an injured man. Six or more shots are heard in the clip which lasts about 60 seconds.

The text accompanying the post states that the recording was made around 6.30 a.m. in the morning after a man named Shaafii Abbaa Simal was arrested because his son, whom security forces wanted to forcibly conscript for the army, was not at home.

He was detained overnight in the school compound but the community intervened, removed Shaafii from custody and took him to hospital, presumably to treat wounds sustained in custody.

Images from the video are shown below. The middle picture shows a man being carried.



Disappearances

ONM reported on 2 June that 60-year old father of five Abraham Qalbeessaa from Bejoo Kobbochaa kebele, Gawo Qebe district, Qellem, has been missing in detention for six months. His wife has looked in vain in six districts only to be told by officials that his location is unknown.

⁵⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1580811356934819>

On 25 June, ONM reported that Duushaa Abraahim, from Waabeekoo kebele, Darimu district, Illubabor, had disappeared in detention after being badly beaten when taken from his home and thrown into an unmarked military vehicle. Police denied any knowledge of his arrest.

W1 reported on 6 July that 65-year old Fiqaaduu Guutamaa (shown right) from Gida Ico village, Gawo Qebe district, Qellem, had been made to disappear in detention three weeks before. Security forces stole his 22 cows when he was taken.



ONM wrote on 11 July that a young man in Haru district, West Wallega, named Abdataa Bajuraa, had been abducted one month previously and his whereabouts were still not known.

Beating and arrests

Widespread arrests have continued throughout western Oromia in response to the support for OLA among the civilian population. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was quoted by ONM on 13 June as having threatened to ‘drive out the guerilla fighters and grab the farmers by the throat’ in reference to OLA’s support base.

There were 28 ONM reports of detention from May to July, 23 of which were in June. W1 sent three reports which referred only to detentions; on 15 July, 17 and 28 August. The ONM reports included arrests in Gimbi, Homa, Lalo Asebi, Guliso, Lata Sibu, Qilxu Kara, Mana Sibu, Boji Birmaji, Aira, Begi, Nejo and Boji Cokorsa districts of West Wallega (12 out of the zone’s 19 districts), Dale Sadi, Dembi Dollo, Gawo Qebe and Lalo Kile districts of Qellem, Hurumu district and Metu town in Illubabor and the districts of Deedoo in Jimma and Mako in Buno Bedele zones.

Most detentions were of civilians accused of supporting OLA or relatives of suspected members of OLA. Large numbers of people were rounded up and properties burned in areas in which OLA had been active, as a form of collective punishment – ‘drying out the ocean to kill the fish’ or as Abiy Ahmed put it ‘grabbing the farmers by the throat’ (see above).

As reported by ONM on 12 June, soldiers moved around towns and rural areas carrying out abuses, looting property, driving away livestock, confiscating smartphones, extorting and stealing money with threats.

A house of mourning in Mana Sibu district, belonging to the parents of a fallen OLA fighter was raided. His father and sister were detained in the district police station and his mother badly beaten. In May, all the belongings of an absent son, Petros Habte, in Marga Gelel, Gimbi district, were burned and his family, for whom he was the sole breadwinner, was told he would be executed if he returned home.

A former militia member from kebele 04 in Mandi town was detained in July after being released by OLA, who had captured him and sent him home. He was accused of conspiring with OLA, detained and tortured. Iyasu Faqadee, a youth in Nejo town, was arrested, beaten and severely injured because he was caught listening to the songs of Haachalu Hundeesa, the assassinated icon of the Qeerroo movement.

As well as targeting suspected OLA sympathisers, any disobedience to the regime was met with collective punishment. After youths in Dooyoo, near Aira town in West Wallega, disarmed a local militia member, a church service was abruptly stopped and the congregation rounded up and collectively fined.

A dispute between villagers in Dafqalla, Deedoo district, Jimma, was used as an excuse for raiding homes and detaining over 40 in overcrowded cells in the kebele police station, as

suspected OLA supporters. A domestic dispute resulted in the detention of a housewife in Nejo for four months, falsely accused of being in contact with OLA.

Other reasons for detention included not supporting the Prosperity Party in the June election and detention for profit. As elsewhere, detention can act as an income stream. In June, wealthy individuals in Metu town in Illubabor were being forced to pay large sums for their release and farmers detained in kebele offices in Aira were reported to be subjected to public floggings and demands to pay huge fines to avoid being transferred to military camps.

Also in June, in Mako district, Bune Bedele, Prosperity Party officials squabbled over the allocation of seized public land and began detaining each other and civilians who had bought land from them. Security official Tasfaa Birhanu was arrested by his colleagues in Begi district for similar reasons. Party members in Nejo town used local police to seize assets of rich Oromo families in order to fund their acquisition of real estate in Nekemte city and Finfinnee.

Large numbers were often detained; 40 in a kebele police station in Jimma, as noted above, and over 300 farmers held for more than three months in Hurumu district prison, Illubabor; all accused of supporting OLA.

The detainees include school students, farmers taken from their fields, health workers, newlyweds and the elderly. Four young schoolgirls, Gudatu Masqabu, Biftu Fiqadu, Biqiltu Fiqadu and Hamnah Alamu, were among those detained and badly beaten by militia based in Wadabu school in Gimbi district. All had their phones stolen and Hannah was transferred to the district prison. Mother of five Shamare Caaltuu Kumara was detained for six months with her children including 12-year old Ifaa Amsalu Adino, in Gawo Qebe district police station in Qellem, because their brother had joined OLA.

Conditions of detention are dire, with shortage of food, water and sleeping space. Youths in Bila town, Boji Birmaji district, West Wallega, were reported to be enduring daily floggings. Like many other detainees they were detained previously; for two years in a high security zonal prison.

Family visits are often forbidden. ONM reported that some of those who had been held in these extremely overcrowded cells spoke of other detainees being removed at night, taken to the forest and killed.

Forced conscription

Within a mere three-week period, from 23 June to 13 July, OSG received reports of widespread forced conscription from Lalo Asebi, Boji Birmaji, Haru, Jarso and Mana Sibu districts of West Wallega and from Gawo Qebe, Sayo, Hawe Galan districts and Dembi Dollo town in Qellem.

Youngsters, including many under-age, were rounded up *en masse*, for example Yohannis Fufa Hika, Tolisa Marara Baru, Lammi Yohannis, Damuse Isayas, Mokonnen Ayana Moti, Iyasu, Ermiyas, Taganye, Maatiyos and Dagafa, on 24 June in Lalo Asebi, several of whom are pictured right, in prison awaiting transfer to a military training camp (W1).



Engineer Solan
Firomsa, Boji
Cokorsa district,
detained 15 July
(W1).



Farmers, including the elderly, the frail, and fathers of young families, were rounded up while tending small plots of land, on which their families depend. For example, Gamachu Yaadata, Hambisa Abara (father of one), Waqqari Abdata (father of three), Masgab Banti (father of two), Tola Sanbato (45-year old father of five) and Addisu Babu (father of three), farmers from Warra Baro village, Haru district, were taken for training, according to ONM on 9 July.

On 7 July, it was reported by ONM that 490 students who had been sitting their national exams in Arawe Dambi town, Mana Sibu district, were being held in Mendi town, pending transfer for military training.

The latest report was from W1 on 28 August. People detained ‘for war’ in Nopha district, Illubabor, included two older men – Geremo Biru (60) and Yishak Abdu (61) and a teacher, Gaari Wakjira. Another, Bahiru Luco, was reported detained in Darimu district, Illubabor.

Celebration of persecution and parasitism

Extortion and theft by the state, corruption and growing criminal networks operating with the cooperation of government are creating conditions incompatible with survival.

The price of the regime’s election celebration is paid by the people. In Saqa Coqorsa district, Jimma zone, residents were forced to pay 5,000 to 10,000 birr to buy a bull. Two oxen were bought by the people of Nejo district for 440,000 birr to celebrate the government victory. The Prosperity Party feasted while Oromo mothers went hungry.

Party cadre Talila Tarafa, the butcher of over 40 young Oromo in Nejo, led the celebration and ran as a candidate for the Oromia Regional Council. And trader Amanuel Waaqgaari profited from his criminal network of government stooges, robbing and harassing Oromo.

The instability of the situation in West Wallega caused Gimbi bank officials to transport their money to Nekemte city in East Wallega. The Mayor of Harroojjii town in Gawo Qebe district, Qellem, Lalisaa Tarfaasaa, and the district party chairman, Milkiyaas, abandoned their government posts and fled into the forest at the end of June, following ‘death threats from rival military commanders.’

Extortion etc.

So much money and grain has been taken by extortion from farmers in Darimu district, Illubabor, that they were reported to be no longer able to buy and sell goods in June.

In Jimma, each village was told to raise 1.5 million birr to support local government militias.

‘Militia support’ was also the reason given for punitive extortion in Mana Sibu district, West Wallega. Land tax, fuel tax and insurance were reasons given by PP officials in Nejo.

Corruption is rife. Party officials in Darimu district, Illubabor, were reported by ONM to be seizing fertiliser which was meant to be sold to farmers, charging frequent and extortionate levies for it and profiting by selling it to wealthy individuals. If taxes were not paid, no fertiliser was given.

Farmers who obtained fertiliser from outlets other than state-subsidised warehouses had their belongings searched and goods seized at roadside check points. Those without recorded purchases from government outlets were prevented by force from ploughing their fields.

In the same district, the chief administrator (Tariku) deployed armed men to levy large taxes on goods going to and from markets, resulting in losses of up to 50,000 and 100,000 birr for community members.

Straightforward theft by soldiers was reported in Qiltu Kara district, West Wallega. Mobile phones belonging to a mother in Igu Komis kebele and a student in Dandi Gudi kebele (two,

together worth 44,000 birr) were taken on 22 May. Militia stole over 2,000 birr from another woman in Qiltu Kara on 19 June. In Mana Sibu district, the theft of two plough oxen from Mustafa Hasan on 25 May was justified by the false accusation that he had links to OLA.

Over 300 bundles of maize were taken from residents of Haro Sabu in Dale Sadi district, Qellem, on 12 July, by militia to feed themselves.

Adding to the pressure on the hard-hit community in Burqa Baraka kebele in Cawaqa district, Buno Bedele zone, was the banning of crops like maize, sorghum and other tall plants, to prevent ambushes by OLA fighters. In August, residents in the district were stopped at road checkpoints and prevented from carrying more than 30 kg of food items. Surplus was claimed to be food for OLA and was confiscated.

A psychological blow to residents of Botor Xolay district in Jimma zone, was the removal at night in June of the memorial statue to the iconic singer Haachalu Hundeessa.

Eviction, displacement, burning and looting

More than 100 families were forced off their land in Gawo Qebe district, Qellem, at the beginning of June, accused of supporting OLA, and made destitute. In the same week, farmers in Dhidheessa district, Buno Bedele zone, were reported to have been evicted in the past three months and resettled on poor land, where they ‘faced severe hardship.’

On 11 June, government militia burned down a home and its contents and made several arrests in Sombo Sodeen Giittan village, Lata Sibu district, West Wallega.

Later in June, in Buno Bedele zone, ONM reported that Oromo farmers in Burqaa Jalala kebele, Dhidheessa district, were removed from their land and resettled in camps in Mako and Dabo districts. Their lands, including valuable crops and established coffee plantations and khat fields were taken by party cadres and militias and sold at knock-down prices (50,000 to 80,000 birr per farm). Complaints were met with accusations of supporting OLA.

West Wallega Human Rights Defenders report ⁶⁰

An edited version of the recently-released report from West Wallega is appended to this report (see p.70) and will shortly be available in the Reports Section of the OSG website at <https://oromiasupport.org/osg-reports/>

Arsi and West Arsi

Killings

In its annual report for 2025, OLLAA claimed that among the killings was that of 23 -year old **Dofte Dalu** in Badi Qallu Kebele, Lemu Bilbilo district in December 2025. The organisation claimed that OLA was responsible.⁶¹

ONM reported that **four detainees** were killed and at least twenty wounded when security forces opened fire at Lokkee prison, Siraro district, West Arsi, on 2 June. ONM named six elders who were given money to ‘buy the silence’ of the detainees’ families.

⁶⁰ The first report from this group was published on the OSG website at https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Violations-in-West-Oromia_-Abuses-in-five-districts-October-2018-April-2021-2.pdf and was included in OSG Report 56. Their second and third reports were incorporated in [Reports 58](#) and [59](#). Subsequent reports on the OSG website were [April 2022](#), [May 2023](#), [February 2024](#) and [July 2024](#). These 4th to 7th reports are summarised in OSG Reports [60](#), [63](#), [65](#) and [67](#), respectively.

⁶¹ <https://ollaa.org/violence-and-impunity-civilian-suffering-inoromia-ethiopia-2025/>

Government soldiers took seven civilians from the district prison, in Guchuu, Shaashee kebele, Gadab Hasaasa district, West Arsi, on 21 June. They drove them to an isolated field and shot them with automatic weapons. **Zarihuun Alamu Ayyaanaa** and **Asheetuu Sumayyee Fayyee** were killed. Dirribaa Hurrissaa, Asheetuu Gishuu Haayilee, and Abbabaa Sumayyee Fayyee were seriously wounded. The other two were taken away in a military vehicle and were said to have disappeared in custody. ONM claimed the shooting was in reprisal for battlefield losses with OLA, to terrorise the local community (ONM, 27 June).

W1 reported that **Mohammed Amaan Hajii Umaar** (shown right) was taken from his home in Sibe Mararo village, Robe district, Arsi, on 1 July. It was reported on 5 July that he had been killed and his body discarded on the road.



Borkena reported on 8 July that at least **four civilians died** when government forces started fighting (presumably against OLA) in Asoko district, Arsi, in the early hours of 7 July. The fighting began in Bio kebele and spread to ‘Chefe, Erecha Michael, Lengcha Oda, the Berarti forest area, Kwas Dire, Dibu, Sunt Maryam, and Weranbus.’⁶²

On 31 July, ONM reported two killings by government security forces in Guna district, Arsi. **Jundii Siraaj Aadam** was taken from prison three days after his arrest, taken to the bush and shot dead. **Yoosuuf Baayyuu** was also killed and his body left in a ravine. Soldiers prevented his family taking him for burial.

ONM recorded the killings of two farmers in Robe district on 6 August. (This probably refers to Robe district, Arsi, rather than Robe district in Bale zone.) **Ullee Sulxii**, a father of seven, and another farmer named **Gosaa**, were executed in front of their homes, falsely accused of having ties with OLA.

W1 reported the killing of **Yusuf Mohammed** (illustrated right), on 8 August in Shirka district, Arsi. He was arrested and then killed by government forces.



Detention

ONM wrote on 9 June that the Heban district administrator, Woyyeessaa Dheekkamaa, was detained because he was suspected of supporting OLA, and replaced by a ‘pro-government’ administrator.

Farmers in Guna district, Arsi, and Shala district in West Arsi, were arbitrarily detained on 18 and 19 June, according to ONM.

On 21 June, the same day as the execution of detainees in Gadab Hasaasaa district, West Arsi (see above), elderly farmers in the district, including twelve named by ONM, were detained on the pretext of their sons being members of OLA. They were held in the same district prison, from where detainees were taken and shot.

Farmers used as human shields

ONM wrote on 24 June that farmers in Qixxee Teessisaa kebele, Siraro district, were made to slaughter their animals to feed government soldiers and forced at gunpoint to walk ahead of

⁶² <https://borkena.com/2026/07/08/news-ethiopia-arsi-renewed-violence-erupts-in-asoko-district-east-arsi-zone-resulting-in-casualties-and-destruction/>

military convoys into dense forest and mountain areas acting as human shields in case of ambushes by OLA.

Extortion, intimidation, beating and robbery

On 7 June, government militia took over the community hall in Shala district, West Arsi, ‘holding meetings and threatening locals.’ On the same day at Afarsoo in the Faraqsa kebele in Marti district, Arsi, Sulxii Arabaa was accused of holding weapons, robbed of 800.000 birr and his shop was looted (ONM).

It was reported on 10 June that 6,000 birr was demanded from households in Shala district for a water project which was not implemented. Residents complained to ONM that they had become ill from drinking unsafe water.

Yaasin Jamaal, a young man in Gololcha district, Arsi, had his vehicle stolen on 20 June according to ONM and was forced to pay 7,000 birr to the authorities to reclaim it.

On 30 June, officials in Shashemane were reported to be extorting money from residents and stealing from city funds (ONM).

ONM reported on 31 July that in urban areas like Dodola, West Arsi, residents were forced to make payments for ‘municipal development and social programs’ and heavy fees were being imposed on ‘local horse-cart operators, three-wheeler drivers, and public transport operators.’

Every household in Sinqellee Goorii village, Shalla district, was forced to pay 1,300 birr to feed militias and two farmers were detained on 4 August for refusing to pay (ONM).

Burning and displacement

Government forces burned villagers’ homes causing displacements in Seru, Sirka and Jaju districts of Arsi in May and June, according to reports by W1 and ONM.



Eight farmers’ properties were burned down in Jaju district on 23 May (ONM). W1 shared a Facebook post showing burning properties in Seru Abbaas on 18 June, from which the image shown right was taken.⁶³

ONM named five farmers among those in Soolee Diigaluu and Gunaa villages, Sirka district, whose homes and property, including crops, were destroyed by government forces on 11 June and reported more displacements in the district on 22 June.

Guji and Borana

Killings

A killing which was reported by OLLAA in its annual report for 2025 and which had not previously been recorded by OSG was that of 37-year old **Suye Qaxala** while she was working on her farm in Tarca, Saba Boru district, Guji. She was nine months pregnant when government security forces shot her dead on 8 August 2025.⁶⁴

At first, it was claimed she had links to OLA but later it was alleged she had died in crossfire during fighting. Her house was burned down and other family members were detained or killed in September 2025 according to the report.

⁶³ <https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1BKIEaBv5s/>

⁶⁴ <https://ollaa.org/violence-and-impunity-civilian-suffering-inoromia-ethiopia-2025/>

Both W1 and ONM reported the shooting to death by security forces of a young boy named **Roba Bantola Gararo** (shown right) in Saransari village, Goro Dola district, Guji on 22 June.

W1 wrote of the killing of **Misgana Dereso** (pictured below) in Kela Karbudo, Shakiso Arero district, Guji, on 2 July. He was shot dead while riding his motorcycle, which is also shown below (with the date in the Ethiopian Calendar).



Lethal clashes with Sidama Region

Addis Standard reported on 29 July that conflict had erupted again for four days during the previous week around the border between Guji and East Sidama zone, Sidama Region.⁶⁵

Dispute over the demarcation of the border, which has been contested for many years due to competition for water and grazing resources, had erupted weeks previously.

OSG reported that at least one villager was killed in May.⁶⁶ *Addis Standard* wrote that **eleven had died** in May in and around the villages of Chiri, Aroressa, and Hoko in East Sidama and **at least ten** in Gubboo Heema and nearby villages in Girja district of Guji Zone.

The violence in May had been precipitated by preparations for the June election with the erection and burning of regional flags after the establishment of a Guji zone polling station in Gubboo Heema.⁶⁷ Unarmed villagers attending the market in Gubboo Heema were attacked by Sidama Region Special Force police and militia. Farmland and homes were burnt, schools and crops destroyed, livestock killed and thousands displaced.

Farmers had returned in July to harvest the remains of their crops of teff, maize and beans in Gubboo Heema but were met once again with gunfire. In this latest episode of violence, *Addis Standard* reported that at least another **eleven were killed** and nearly 40 others wounded. At least **ten were estimated** to have been killed on the Sidama side of the border.

Addis Standard also reported that clashes in March between East Sidama and West Arsi residents had left over a dozen dead.

Detention

ONM reported that in June over 120 people were being held without charge, on suspicion of supporting OLA, in Surroo Barguddaa district, West Guji and that a school principal, Galmaa Shinii, and a 2nd grade teacher, Alakee Galmaa, in Yabelo district, Borana zone were detained on 16 June, also accused of supporting OLA.

⁶⁵ <https://addisstandard.com/renewed-ormia-sidama-border-clashes-leave-several-dead-school-burned-crops-destroyed-as-residents-question-peace-efforts/>

⁶⁶ OSG Report 73, p.66. <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-73-12-June-2026.pdf>

⁶⁷ <https://addisstandard.com/sidama-regional-government-states-conflict-between-east-guji-zones-and-sidama-region-has-ceased-residents-describe-severity-of-the-incident/>

Water shortage and contamination

Thousands of families in Booree town, Guji zone, were reported in June to be without access to safe drinking water because Prosperity Party officials have for several years been misdirecting funds collected for infrastructure improvement into private real estate projects and political campaigning. Mothers have been made to trek long distances to obtain water from rivers which are contaminated, resulting in a sharp increase in water borne diseases, especially in children. Public protests have been suppressed by security forces (ONM).

Forest destruction

The District Administrator of Adola district in Guji, Nagaash Bulaallaa, and a ‘local chief,’ Turee Haroo Basaayyee, were described by ONM as deliberately burning down forest areas in the district in mid-June, claiming that OLA fighters were using the forest to hide in.

Tigray Region

Increasingly bellicose rhetoric in Ethiopia and Tigray, matched by the build-up of armed forces near the region’s border, have raised concerns that another major war is possible. Conservative estimates of the death toll in the 2020-2022 conflict are 600,000, without taking into account all of the deaths due to preventable diseases related to poverty and famine in its aftermath. It is quite possible that the combined total of civilian and military fatalities was nearer to one million – one sixth of the population of Tigray.

Regional expert Kjetil Tronvoll warned that, even if neither side wished a renewed conflict, minor skirmishes as occurred near Shererina on 31 July could escalate due to ‘reciprocal military responses and political miscalculation.’⁶⁸

Forced conscription into the Tigrayan Defence Force has been occurring since April, according to *Human Rights Watch*.⁶⁹ Both *HRW* and *Addis Standard* report that youngsters have been rounded up and taken from Mekele in buses, for military training.⁷⁰ Children as young as 15 are being abducted against their and their parents’ will.

The governing TPLF issued a proclamation in June ordering a mass mobilisation. Involuntary recruits have been taken in night-time house-to-house searches, from work in artisanal gold mines, and from markets, streets and offices. Youths and young adults driving water carts and *bajaj* taxis, daily workers and farmers have been taken. Beatings of the reluctant conscripts have been witnessed. Regional media have called for all former combatants to re-enlist.

Anxious relatives are kept ignorant of conscripts’ locations. Parents reported being held in administration offices without food and water and ordered to produce their children for conscription. Many have tried to leave the region for Finfinnee but have been prevented at checkpoints and roadblocks. Thousands of Tigrayans have marched in protest in Finfinnee, according to *The Continent*.⁷¹

As well as the dangers of battle, female recruits have reported widespread sexual abuse by commanding officers as revealed to *The New Humanitarian*.⁷²

⁶⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/kjetil.tronvoll/> 1 August

⁶⁹ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/07/06/ethiopia-tigray-authorities-forcibly-recruiting-civilians>

⁷⁰ <https://addisstandard.com/tigray-authority-vows-accountability-over-alleged-forced-youth-conscription-as-mekelle-residents-describe-mounting-fear/>

⁷¹ No. 246, 25 July, https://www.thecontinent.org/files/ugd/287178_b44e8c33e7c644d687d959f61408490e.pdf

⁷² <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2026/07/15/war-ethiopia-women-soldiers-sexual-violence>

Benishangul-Gumuz Region

Shooting

Alaaminaa Abbaay, a farmer in Fixii, Goongoo kebele, Bulan district, Metekel zone, was taken into the forest, shot and seriously wounded by government soldiers on 9 June. He was left in the forest and was not found by other villagers until the following day. He is a respected local figure and was unjustly accused of having links to OLA (ONM).

Detention

At least 16 civilians were reported by ONM on 25 June to be detained in Galessa town central prison. Among those being held and mistreated in the prison were Jireenyaa Balaayi and Abiraaham, from Giiphoo kebele, Dibaax district, and Goongoo kebele, Bulan district.

ONM reported on 11 August farmer Muluu Abdiisaa, Dibaax district, was arrested on fabricated charges, detained in a military camp, and tortured.

Displacement

Government officials evicted Oromo farmers from their land in Goongoo kebele, Bulan district, in early June. ONM reported on 12 June that land belonging to a large number of heads of households was taken and sold to ‘Amhara extremists’ by armed government militia. The displaced families were said to be destitute and living without shelter.

RSF base attacked

W1 reported on 4 July that an RSF training camp in Asosa zone (see Introduction, pp.7-9) was burned down following a drone attack (images shown right).



Forced conscription

Oromo youngsters in Asosa zone were reportedly being singled out and rounded up from their homes and workplaces in July and taken for military training (ONM, 15 July).

Gambella Region

Killing

A young Oromo man was killed in Gambella city on 22 June. **Ismaa’el Faasil** was attacked in daylight at the Gabaa Dam Bank marketplace. State security forces did not intervene when assailants cut his throat with a dagger before fleeing ‘without hindrance’ (ONM).

Central Ethiopia Region

Gurage Zone Killings

Borkena reported on 10 August the execution of three young men in Agna, Abeshige district, Gurage zone, Central Ethiopia Region.⁷³

The young men, all originally from Amhara Region, **Temesgen Getachew**, **Yitagesu Asegdew**, and **Gizaw Girmaye**, were taken from a public minibus by government security forces – federal soldiers in collaboration with local police and militia – and falsely accused of being members of Fano.

⁷³ <https://borkena.com/news-three-young-men-executed-in-gurage-zone-over-alleged-fano-ties/>

Their hands were tied behind their backs before they were beaten and then summarily executed by shots to the head. Their bodies were then dumped in the open in Nacha Kelit kebele, where they had been living. Residents and their families were forbidden from taking them for burial for three days, while their bodies were desecrated by wild animals. The picture shown above right accompanied the *Borkena* report.



Refugees

This important section of the report begins with a Press Release on behalf of two refugee organisations, one recently formed and another in the process of becoming established.



The African refugee crisis: A crisis for whom?

Rich countries who complain of a refugee crisis now spend billions to keep refugees from their borders. But the real crisis is not theirs. It is more of a crisis for the low and middle-income countries which host most refugees. But the real and most palpable crisis is for refugees themselves.

They are the people surviving life-threatening insecurity and destitution, with damaged physical and mental health, due to the greed and selfishness of the first world; the world which controls international finance so that Africa spends more in servicing its debt than it does in educating and caring for its children.

Even the small amount of face-saving 'development aid' has been slashed and the UN body established to help refugees, UNHCR, is so short of funds that it has closed offices and reduced or cancelled real help in terms of subsistence and access to education and health care.

Assistance to Oromo and other refugees in Egypt, Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia and Yemen has been reduced or stopped altogether. Corruption in government bodies and UNHCR has compounded their problems in Kenya, Uganda and South Africa.

Governments of these countries are complicit in the hostility which meets refugees. Paranoid and unsubstantiated assertions about the effects of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile have added to Egypt's xenophobic response to Oromo and others from Ethiopia.

They are among the more than a million refugees in Egypt; from Sudan, Palestine and elsewhere. More than a hundred Oromo are among several hundreds detained. At least fifteen, including registered asylum seekers, have been illegally returned to Ethiopia this

year. Oromo are frightened to attend work or take their children to school in case they are detained, abused and deported.

In Somaliland, thousands of Oromo have been left destitute after UNHCR withdrew subsistence allowances last year. Assistance for schooling and access to health care was withdrawn this year. A government warning for undocumented migrants to leave by the end of June has been lifted, at least temporarily, but extortionate sums have been demanded for new immigrant ID cards. Oromo card-holders have been told they are excluded from the, now government-run, refugee determination process. Amharas and Tigrayans have not been excluded, in a clear case of discrimination.

In north Yemen, the UNHCR office in Sana'a has been closed down; services reduced or stopped. About 1,500 Oromo are mandated refugees, among the 6-7,000 who have been present for many years in Sana'a. Throughout the Houthi-administered north of Yemen, Oromo, especially the migrants intent on facing lethal force trying to cross into Saudi Arabia, are subject to extortion and kidnap for ransom by traffickers and to forced conscription into Houthi militia.

Asylum-seekers in Djibouti may wait years for status determination and even then they have difficulty accessing employment and education. There is no assistance in Djibouti and those in Hol Hol and Ali Addeh camps have to survive on reduced rations.

Hooligans and vigilantes in South Africa have political backing in their organised intimidation and violence against all immigrants, whatever documentation they have. Gangs are demanding 'protection money' and four young Oromo asylum-seekers in Cape Town were killed in the second week of July alone,⁷⁴ for failing to pay.

Refugees are being prevented from earning a living in small retail outlets and other jobs. In deference to the mobs, the government has established border courts to make snap decisions on asylum and deportation. Some countries have sent planes to bring home their endangered economic migrants.

Meanwhile, would-be migrants to South Africa are prosecuted after being captured and criminalised in Kenya and Zambia.

As Europe and the USA teeter on the brink of right-wing authoritarianism and racist nationalism, they pour billions of dollars and Euros into countries which surround them, to staunch the flow of migrants. Europe funds coastguards in Libya and Tunisia which incarcerate, torture, extort and enslave migrants. Meanwhile, thousands die attempting to cross the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and probably even more die in the deserts of Sudan, Libya and Djibouti trying to reach the sea, to escape hardship and abuse in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Living without adequate shelter, food, employment and hope, in misery and destitution, often without legal status, causes lifelong harm to individuals and their societies. Suicide among refugees is not uncommon and has been recorded at least in Somaliland and Dadaab camp in Kenya. Pitifully small numbers are resettled in third countries, as backlogs in registration and refugee status determination have grown from months to years.

Rich countries support abusive regimes and international deals which are at the root of abuse and persecution in poor countries. It is high time they shouldered responsibility for the real refugee crisis, the crisis experienced every day by refugees themselves.

⁷⁴ At least six have been killed, two or more of whom are Oromo – see South Africa, below.

This can be done by funding organisations which help refugees – UN, national aid bodies, faith organisations and civil society organisations – and by wealthy countries reflecting on their roles in manufacturing the crisis in the first place.

17 July 2026

The *Oromo Relief and Development Association* has been recently established in Toronto and is establishing a presence in Sudan and elsewhere in Africa. This press release has been produced in collaboration with the newly formed *Oromia Refugee Network*, which is organised by Oromo refugees in Egypt, Yemen, Djibouti, Somaliland, Kenya, Uganda and South Africa – see <https://oromiarefugeenetwork.org/>

Egypt

Deaths in detention and on the street in Cairo

Two suspicious deaths in detention in Cairo were reported by the Oromo community on 29 July.

Yared Jermo Zahido (pictured right) was a 35-year old registered asylum-seeker, married with a dependent wife and child.⁷⁵ He was detained in Cairo on 18 July. Yared was taken to a government immigration facility on 21 July, where his documents were found to be in order. He was issued with a residency permit and returned to Dar El Salam police station in Cairo on 22 July with instructions for his release.



According to a fellow detainee and Yared's family, on the evening of 22 July, a police officer in control of his release asked for a bribe but Yared had nothing to give him. Yared was then taken from his cell. About 15 minutes later, an officer returned to the cell and informed other detainees that Yared had died. He had no known medical condition.



On 31 July, OSG was sent a copy of the document pictured left which states that Yared died of a lung disease. He had never experienced lung problems according to his family and community.

Violence against detainees in Dar El Salam police station has been reported previously.⁷⁶ Torture and killing of detainees in police stations in Cairo is has occurred in the recent past.^{77, 78}

Another detainee, Mrs Aya Tesema Kereno, from the Walaita community, was reported by the Oromo community to have died unexpectedly in late July at Sheikh Zayed 1st Police Station, Giza Governorate, Cairo. Her status was not known but the document shown right indicates she was processed by Ethiopian authorities for return to Finfinnee, on 10 July.



⁷⁵ Yared Zigdu on UNHCR documents: UNHCR File Number: 555-17C03963, Date of Birth 22 October 1990.

⁷⁶ <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/latest/egypt-authorities-must-release-protesters-and-activists-detained-over-palestine/>

⁷⁷ <https://www.cfjustice.org/egypt-committee-for-justice-documents-the-death-of-a-detainee-inside-al-salam-second-police-station-in-cairo/>

⁷⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/jan/24/cairo-egypt-police-station-secret-filming-appears-to-show-torture>



Post mortem examinations were not performed on Yared or Aya. Yared's body was returned to Ethiopia for burial. Aya's body was still in a hospital morgue in Cairo as this report went to press (6 September). Yared's wife and child remain in Cairo, without protected status.

Another unrelated death, of a young Oromo boy, Hamza Mohammed Ahmad (shown left), was reported by ISS, OSG's representative in Cairo. On 3 August, the boy, aged about 15, was robbed of his phone and killed on his way to Al Azhar Quranic School and Mosque, only one kilometre from his home. His family did not accompany him because of fear of arrest and refolement by police. He was beaten, possibly by Sudanese people, during the previous week.

The deaths of Yared and, almost certainly, Aya were avoidable consequences of the crackdown this year on refugees and asylum-seekers in Egypt. They are not isolated instances. On 26 March, *Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights* reported that seven refugees and migrants had died in detention since the start of the year. At least five of them were registered with UNHCR.⁷⁹ In its report on 7 July, *Human Rights Watch* quoted a report that 12 Sudanese asylum-seekers had died in detention since January.⁸⁰

Insecurity and fear

The conditions of detention are filthy, overcrowded and dangerous. Migrants are held with violent criminals who control the distribution of water and food in the cells, which hold up to 100. They are so cramped that bribes are paid to have space to lie down. Beatings ensure that the coercion to sign documents agreeing to 'voluntary' repatriation is often successful. Court orders for the release of detainees are not observed or enforced. Estimates of the numbers detained in the first three months of the year vary from 3,000 to 10,000.

As OSG reported in its last report,⁸¹ Egypt hosts over 1.1million refugees and asylum-seekers, most of whom have fled from Sudan. This total does not include another 100,000 refugees from Palestine. Numbers are swollen by foreign workers, especially from Syria, who apply for asylum when told they have to pay \$1,000 for residency if they rely on tourist visas. Out of more than 1.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers, less than 4,000 (under 0.4%) were resettled to third countries in 2025.

Underfunded and overwhelmed, UNHCR handed over the responsibility for the documentation of asylum-seekers and refugees to the Egyptian authorities in December 2024. But, as noted by *Human Rights Watch* in July,⁸² the new arrangement gives 'broad discretionary powers' to the Permanent Committee for Refugee Affairs, 'excludes asylum-seekers from temporary protections and access to services granted to refugees, increases the risks of arbitrary detention and deportation, fails to explicitly prohibit refolement, and was adopted without meaningful consultation with UNHCR.'

Egypt is a signatory to the 1951 UN convention and the 1969 OAU convention respecting the rights of refugees. Overdue legislation following the handing over of refugee registration and status determination in December 2024 was still not complete when the leader of the Permanent Committee for Refugee Affairs, former head of the State Information Service,

⁷⁹ <https://eipr.org/en/publications/unprecedented-crackdown-refugees-and-migrants-egypt>

⁸⁰ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/07/07/egypt-refugees-asylum-seekers-arrested-deported>

⁸¹ OSG Report 73, pp.3-6 and 71-74. <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/OSG-Report-73-12-June-2026.pdf>

⁸² <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/07/07/egypt-refugees-asylum-seekers-arrested-deported>

Salah Eddin Abdel Sadeq, was appointed in February. Nevertheless, the EU has given unconditional support to Egypt managing its refugee affairs.⁸³

As well as the responsibility for documentation, the huge backlog for registration and status determination was also handed over. Appointments for residency permits are being scheduled for 2027 and 2028. The reason given for detention in 90% of cases is failure to carry a residency permit.

In any case, unless applications for registration with UNHCR were accompanied with full documentation (when a yellow card is given) or individuals have refugee status (with a blue card), residency permits are not given. The thousands with white cards (awaiting registration as an asylum-seeker without formal documentation, renewable every six months) can be detained anytime. In many cases, such documentation is irrelevant in any case. Registered asylum-seekers and documented refugees are among those detained and deported. Detainees report having their documents destroyed by the police who arrest them.

Migrants report being rounded up, sometimes based only on skin colour, in house-to-house searches, street checkpoints, public transport, work places (for the lucky few) and from places where migrants need to be – refugee schools, service providers' offices and UNHCR.

The duty to protect refugees and asylum-seekers, which should have been a shared concern of UNHCR and Egypt, appears now to be of no concern to either.

UNHCR did respond to OSG in June but was unable to commit to visiting those in detention and did not reply to the reports of deaths in custody. Four UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteurs have complained about the increasing numbers detained and deported from Egypt.⁸⁴ However, there is no evidence that UNHCR has made any effort to prevent the detention and deportation of migrants or improve the deplorable conditions of their confinement.

What remains is a situation where thousands continue to be detained, without prospect of imminent release, and score of thousands of registered asylum-seekers and refugees are too fearful of arrest and deportation to move about in the capital, go to work, meet together or attend places of education.

All correspondence with refugees or their representatives includes admissions of fear and insecurity. Advocates for refugees, leaders of the Oromo Elders Union, are especially vulnerable. They have been told that they are at risk from Ethiopian government personnel, by community members who are warned not to be associated with them.

Saudi Arabia

Ten recent executions for minor drug offences

Despite the release of 1,655 Ethiopians from Saudi Arabia's prisons, announced with some fanfare by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of June,⁸⁵ executions of Ethiopians for non-lethal drug offences continue. *Human Rights Watch* investigated the

⁸³ <https://storage.googleapis.com/madamast/en/2026/02/25/news/u/first-head-appointed-to-new-national-committee-on-refugee-affairs-amid-ongoing-arrest-campaigns/index.html>

⁸⁴ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/egypt-un-experts-raise-alarm-over-violations-against-refugees-and-migrants>

⁸⁵ <https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/news/366866/ethiopia-secures-amnesty-for-1655-nationals-imprisoned-in-saudi-arabia>

execution of five young Tigrayans on 27 July and reported the execution of another five youngsters from Ethiopia, one month previously, on 23 June.⁸⁶

They were convicted of smuggling hashish, although at least one of those killed in June carried only qat – a mild stimulant commonly used and found socially acceptable in Ethiopia and Yemen.

The youths executed in July had made the dangerous trip to Yemen in 2022, fleeing the Tigray war. They were exhausted and destitute in Yemen for one year before being persuaded to carry packages to Saudi Arabia in exchange for guided passage. They were arrested when walking at a roadside, not knowing they had reached Saudi Arabia.

They were kept in Khamis Mushait prison, Asir province, for three years during which they had three court appearances lasting from three to twenty minutes, two of which were held remotely. The youths were made to sign documents written in Arabic, which they did not understand. They had no legal representation and translation was only provided for two of the hearings.

The executions bring the total for drug related offences to 17, out of a total of 116 since the beginning of 2026. In 2025, 68% of executions were for nonlethal drug-related offences.

Amnesty International reported on 7 July 2025 that 1,816 had been executed in Saudi Arabia over the preceding decade, one third for minor drug offences.⁸⁷ Between the lifting of a two-and-a-half year moratorium on the death penalty in November 2022, and July 2025, 262 had been judicially killed for nonlethal drug offences. Of 345 executions in 2024, 122 were for such offences.

In early 2022, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced limitations to the use of the death penalty – several months before it was recommenced. Youngsters who were as young as 12 when their offences were committed remain at risk of execution in Saudi Arabia.

Yemen

Saudi air strikes and ‘one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises’

Refugees in Sana’a reported to the Oromia Support Group that Houthi military targets and Hodeidah port facilities in north Yemen were hit by air strikes from Saudi Arabia on 24 July. Media reports confirmed the attack (see image below).⁸⁸



Saudi Strikes Yemen: Houthi-Controlled Hodeidah Hit As Red Sea Crisis Escalates | Iran War Tensions

Human Rights Watch reported on 28 July that there had been five attacks on Sana’a airport by Saudi Arabia on 13 July.⁸⁹ Over one year ago, according to *AP*, 153 civilians were killed and 243 wounded in US air strikes against Houthi forces around Sana’a and the port of Ras Isa in April 2025.⁹⁰

The July attacks followed strikes on shipping and US bases by Houthi forces which back Iran against the US/Israeli

⁸⁶ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/07/28/saudi-arabia-new-executions-of-ethiopian-migrants>

⁸⁷ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde23/9524/2025/en/>

⁸⁸ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aNkSwiQJN00>

⁸⁹ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/07/28/strikes-endangering-civilians-in-yemen-and-saudi-arabia>

⁹⁰ <https://apnews.com/article/yemen-civilians-killed-pentagon-houthis-c5e2190729a93aa54f6a4d5d1232f3ce3>

offensive. The *International Crisis Group* reported more areas of conflict and warned of a return of war on 18 August.⁹¹ Risks to civilians from bombing and fighting compound the already severe difficulties faced by citizens and refugees in the impoverished country.

UNHCR wrote in January 2026 that about 19.5 million, almost half of Yemen's 43 million population, were in need of humanitarian assistance during the previous year.⁹² Four out of five of the population live below the poverty line, including 4.8 million internally displaced and more than 60,000 registered refugees and asylum-seekers.

In its 2025 Annual Report for Yemen,⁹³ UNHCR described the country as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Oromo community representatives wrote on 25 July that many Yemeni citizens were fleeing from Sana'a to stay with relatives outside the city because of the Saudi air strikes, but this option was not available to the refugees. If they leave Sana'a, their documents would be seized and they would be at even greater risk of forced conscription by Houthi militia and of capture, torture and extortion by traffickers.

About three quarters of the settled refugees and asylum-seekers in Yemen are from Somalia. About one quarter are from Ethiopia and at least those in Sana'a are mostly Oromo.

The destitution and food shortages in Yemen are particularly severe in the Houthi-controlled area in the north, which includes the nominal capital, Sana'a, where the majority of Oromo long-standing refugees are concentrated. Movement is severely restricted. Medical help is inaccessible. Very few children attend school.

Community representatives, who belong to the Oromia Refugee Network, estimate that about 1,500 mandated refugees and their dependants live in Sana'a, including about 50 widows with their children and at least ten unaccompanied children. Some of the refugees have been in Sana'a for 25 years.

Another 6,000 to 7,000 in the city are registered asylum-seekers. The settled, documented Oromo population in Sana'a is therefore 8,000 or more but there are unknown numbers of undocumented migrants, many or most of whom are outside the capital in transit to the Saudi border, which thousands cross each year.

Over 100,000 arrived in Yemen in 2025 on their way to Saudi Arabia. About 95% of these were from Ethiopia, including Oromo, Amhara and Tigrayans. Nearly 14,000 arrived in July alone, 91% of whom were from Ethiopia.⁹⁴

Many are detained in holding camps in Sada, where dozens have been killed by Saudi air strikes in recent years.⁹⁵ Hundreds have been shot dead by Saudi border forces when attempting the crossing.⁹⁶ Thousands have been held in lethally insanitary conditions in Saudi Arabia:⁹⁷ some have been executed for minor crimes after perfunctory court hearings (see above, pp.58-59).⁹⁸

⁹¹ <https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/middle-east-north-africa/yemen-saudi-arabia/yemens-war-returning>

⁹² <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unhcr-yemen-protection-brief-2025>

⁹³ <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2026-06/unhcr-annual-results-report-2025-yemen.pdf>

⁹⁴ https://addisstandard.com/50600-ethiopians-left-country-in-first-quarter-of-2026-amid-economic-hardship-migrant-exploitation/#google_vignette

⁹⁵ OSG Report 59, p.34. <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/Report-59.pdf>

⁹⁶ <https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/08/21/they-fired-us-rain/saudi-arabian-mass-killings-ethiopian-migrants-yemen-saudi> and OSG Report 63, pp.40-42. <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/Report-63.pdf>

⁹⁷ OSG Report 58, pp.31-34. <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/Report-58.pdf>

⁹⁸ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/07/saudi-arabia-escalation-executions-foreign-nationals-drug-related-offences/>

Houthi (Ansar Allah) forces were redesignated as terrorists by the USA in March 2025. They have made the work of UNHCR in north Yemen extremely difficult and held 73 UN staff in detention as of January 2026. Out of 3,500 new registrations by UNHCR in 2025, only 585 asylum-seekers were registered in Sana'a.

Although not apparent from the UNHCR 2025 year report, published in May 2026, the office in Sana'a is reported by refugees to have been closed and non-operational since December 2025. Assistance of any kind has stopped – finance, food supplements and healthcare. There was no warning of the impending closure from UNHCR.

Asylum-seekers and mandate refugees have no-one to turn to for protection and no opportunity to renew their status and documentation. Without up-to-date documents, they risk arrest, harassment and other abuse. Inability to pay rent leads to eviction and life on the streets.

Extreme hostility is experienced by refugees in Yemen. In 2021, 450 undocumented migrants, mostly Oromo, who had been held for six months or more in unsanitary conditions in a holding centre in Sana'a, were killed when an explosive device was thrown or fired into the building after two migrant representatives were shot dead.⁹⁹ Hundreds were then transported out of the city, later spending weeks stranded on the sea shore near to Aden.¹⁰⁰

Refugee representatives wrote to the Oromia Support Group again on 29 July 'They are trapped by the conflict and are struggling to survive, fearing for their own lives and the lives of their children.'

EU funds abuse and xenophobia in Libya and Tunisia



The European Union and its border agency, Frontex (also funded by UK), are helping and funding the return of migrants to Libya and Tunisia, where they face violent racist abuse, extortion and deportation.

The 2023 EU deal with the authoritarian regime in Tunisia, worth \$300 million according to *The Continent*, included €105 million to bolster the control of its Mediterranean border. Official policy is to prevent the threatened 'change in demographics' by the expulsion of nearly 5,000 migrants from Tunisia in the past year.

⁹⁹ OSG Report 55, pp.24-25. <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/Report-55-April-2021.pdf>

¹⁰⁰ OSG Report 59, pp.33-35. <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/Report-59.pdf>

In June and July, the complicity of the EU in assisting and paying for the return of migrants attempting to reach Europe from Tunisia was reported by *The Continent* and *Human Rights Watch*,^{101,102} and from Libya, by *Amnesty International* and *The New Humanitarian*.^{103,104}

With EU money and despite the protests of 46 humanitarian organisations, Tunisia's Coast Guards are recklessly and violently intercepting migrant vessels and returning migrants to face detention, torture, sexual violence, racist abuse and deportation. Migrants are returned south to the desert or trafficked to Libya.

Hate speech by government officials and racial profiling on the streets target Black Africans, including Tunisian nationals. There is no path for claiming asylum in Tunisia since the government suspended the work of UNHCR in 2024. Subjected to frequent detention and extortion of bribes for release, migrants describe 'living in an open-air prison.'

Part of the EU funding went to the National Guard and to police: who have been cracking down on dissent, judicial independence, civil society organisations, lawyers and journalists. NGOs have been criminalised.

In February 2026, the EU classified Tunisia as a 'safe country of origin' for returning asylum-seekers.



Netherlands' Prime Minister Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Tunisian President Kais Saied, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, at the presidential palace in Carthage, Tunisia, July 16, 2023. © 2023 Tunisian Presidency/AP Images

The situation in Libya is not dissimilar. *The New Humanitarian* described Europe's plan to expand its cooperation despite escalating violence by Libya's Coast Guards when intercepting boats carrying migrants. On 11 May, they fired on a vessel rescuing 90 from a floundering boat. In September 2025, shots were fired when another rescue boat was taking onboard 66 migrants in distress. There have been 79 violent incidents since 2016. They are increasing in frequency, with 21 in 2025 alone.

Hundreds of thousands of Euros have been given to bolster the Coast Guards since an agreement in 2017. In addition, millions have been spent on Frontex, a paramilitary force whose activities include monitoring the Mediterranean Sea and shores with planes and drones from an aerial surveillance control room in Warsaw. Frontex shares its information with the Libyan Coast Guard and has acknowledged witnessing violent incidents which have put lives at risk when Coast Guards have acted on information provided by Frontex.

Italy issued a decree in 2023 which penalised rescue organisations with fines and the confiscation of their vessels. Instead of asking the captain of the vessel which was attacked on 11 May about the actions of the Libyan Coast Guard, the Italian authorities investigated him for facilitating irregular migration.

The EU announced in June, its plans to deepen 'migrant co-operation' with the Government of National Unity (GNU) which controls the coast around Tripoli, and with the self-named

¹⁰¹ [The Continent, Issue 244](#), 20 June 2026.

¹⁰² <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/07/16/eu-tunisia-migration-deal-worsening-human-rights-violations>

¹⁰³ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/06/libya-eu-rival-authorities-intensify-xenophobic-and-racist-crackdown-on-refugees-and-migrants-in-libya-as-eu-seeks-to-deepen-ties/>

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2026/07/13/eu-expands-libya-cooperation-despite-repeated-warnings-over-violence-sea>

‘Libya Government’, controlled by the Libya Arab Armed Forces (the LAAF), which controls the east. *Amnesty International* reports LAAF has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. The eastern Libyan shores have become more popular for irregular migrants and are becoming of more interest to ‘fortress Europe.’

In late June, the eastern ‘Libya Government’ announced a ban on the entry of migrants from Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. *AP* reported that the country hosted more than 900,000 refugees, mostly from Sudan.¹⁰⁵

Both of the competing governing forces in Libya, controlling its west and its east, have cracked down on refugees and migrants, with thousands being arrested and deported this year. Migrants live amid a hostile community, encouraged by government hate speech. The public demonstrated against migrants at the UNHCR office in Tripoli and deposited a barricade of sand outside it. Security forces looked on, passive.

Vigilante mobs and security forces cleared migrant camps as officials announce that Libya will not be ‘a land of settlement of Africans;’ specifically Black Africans of course. Children are among those detained. In early May alone, 800 (mostly Sudanese) were deported from around Tripoli. Another 7,000 or more were detained in east Libya, awaiting deportation.

All sources referred to the dangers faced by those taken from migrant boats and returned to detention centres where they are subjected to beatings, rape, torture, extortion and exploitation as slaves.

Kenya

Life in Kenya is getting hard; even harder for refugees. *The Standard* reported on 23 July that four out of five Kenyans (43.9 of the country’s 54.2 million) could no longer afford a healthy diet due to increasing prices and reduced real wages.¹⁰⁶ As reported by OSG previously, food is particularly short in Kakuma and Dadaab camps, where the great majority of the country’s 852,000 refugees live.



Lack of security is also a problem inside and outside the camps. Former Deputy President, Geoffrey Rigathi Gachagua (right) announced on *Citizen TV* on 26 July that Kenya was not safe for Kenyans or foreigners because there were ‘too many goons everywhere.’¹⁰⁷

As seen on the travel advice map left, Kakuma and Dadaab camps (in the very northeast and northwest) are both in the red area where people are advised to avoid.

¹⁰⁵ <https://apnews.com/article/libya-ban-sudan-african-migrants-fa88f69963117d03cdf75182021cdcb4>

¹⁰⁶ <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001553544/sh582-a-day-healthy-eating-slips-out-of-reach-for-44m-kenyans-un-report-shows>

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JWOGqHZMlt0>



Armed criminals, in league with the police and with the corrupt Department of Refugee Services, were involved in the kidnapping of Yasin Ibrahim Onto, a registered Oromo refugee, at the DRS office in Nairobi, on 21 July. He and another abductee were taken against their will to Kakuma camp near the border with South Sudan, until freed with the aid of the organisation *Pugna Malum* a few days later.

The ‘goons’ used a Toyota van (left) for the abduction. It was equipped with two sets of number plates (KBZ 339X and GKC 136C) which were interchanged several times on the journey to Kakuma.

The DRS closed its doors to asylum applicants from Ethiopia and Eritrea in October 2025, a decision which is still being contested in Kenya’s courts. Meanwhile, registration and status determination has been on hold.



In a Memo, circulated to its staff on 6 August, the DRS apologised for being unable to pay salaries, due, it said, to a delay in the arrival of funds from UNHCR.

Refugees demonstrated on 16 July and arranged for representatives to meet with the Deputy Commissioner of DRS and with UNHCR.

A piece of good news was the freeing of 54 Eritrean refugees from different police stations in Nairobi, where they were being held for ransom. After a Bungoma court ruling at the end of June to process their asylum claims and a seven-month legal battle, the 54 were freed and taken to Kakuma camp in mid-August.

Djibouti

There have been no recent incidents of refoulement back to Ethiopia but that is the only crumb of comfort for the 36,000 refugees and asylum-seekers in Djibouti. There are about 25,000 mandate refugees, of whom 15,000 are from Ethiopia – mostly Oromo, and about 10,000 asylum-seekers. Children comprise about 40% of the total. The majority (85%) live in refugee camps at Ali Addeh (56%) or Holl Holl (23%). UNHCR reported about 6% live in the camp at Markazi.

UNHCR no longer functions in Djibouti. There has been no contact or support for the vulnerable refugees and asylum-seekers since the end of 2024; no subsistence allowance, no arranged health care and, apart from much-reduced World Food Program help in the camps, there is no food assistance.

Even the sparse rations in the camps are provided in a discriminatory way, with Oromo at the bottom of the list, after Somalis. New arrivals are not registered and do not even get tents for shelter.

Without UNHCR to renew documents, the Oromia Refugee Network (ORN) estimates 80% of migrants are now undocumented. Any registration depends on ONARS, the Djibouti immigration authority, and then only if a bribe is paid.

On 5 July, ORN reported at least six had died and another four were ill in hospital. Families in Djiboutiville struggle to eat every day and are unable to afford to bury their dead. Children and elderly are in precarious health.

The police do not recognise documents so ‘you have to pay ransom.’

Nonetheless, Djibouti remains an integral part of the Eastern migration route for Ethiopia's refugees. ORN reported that nine died of thirst in the desert trying to reach the Djibouti coast in the first week of August.

Without UNHCR, refugees and asylum-seekers in Djibouti feel isolated and unprotected.

Somaliland

According to information received from the Oromia Refugee Network on 5 July and 9 August, the majority of Oromo refugees and asylum-seekers live in loose urban communities in the capital Hargeisa and the coastal town of Berbera, which also attracts many migrants risking the sea journey to Yemen.

About 18,500 refugees and asylum-seekers live in Somaliland, of whom about 8,000 are school-age children. There is also a small Oromo community, perhaps 1,000, living in Arabsiyo, between the Ethiopian border and Hargeisa.

Oromo communities rely entirely on precarious informal labour since UNHCR withdrew subsistence allowances in April 2024. The allowances for refugees in Bosaso, Puntland, were stopped two years previously and the UNHCR office there was closed in early 2026.

Hate speech against migrants and large scale deportations from Somaliland took place in 2024. When the Somaliland Ministry of Resettlement and Humanitarian Affairs (MORHA) announced on 22 June 2026 that all undocumented migrants must leave within ten days, it was feared that deportations might again begin in earnest.

However, timely discussions between refugee representatives, UNHCR and MORHA resulted in an agreement under which no deportations have occurred.

Instead, Oromo refugees and asylum-seekers were made to purchase one of three sorts of card for \$120. The criteria for obtaining which card were unclear but their categories were 'Passport Collection Card' (two shown below left), 'Temporary Card' (two below right) and 'Immigration Residency Card' (bottom right).



However, these cards and the protection they provide against deportation come at a price. Oromo card holders are not allowed to apply for asylum with the government body which took over Refugee Status Determination from UNHCR at the end of 2024.

This directive therefore denies the opportunity for resettlement for anyone without prior UNHCR refugee status. Oromo are no longer allowed to register as asylum-seekers in Somaliland, unlike Tigrayans or Amharas, according to ORN.

Since January 2026, UNHCR no longer supports Oromo schoolchildren and about half of the 2,265 children who were enrolled for the 2025/2026 academic year have dropped out because their families could not afford related costs.

These 2,265 already comprised less than half of Oromo school age children. Prospects for the few who complete secondary school are poor – very few are employed.

Withdrawal of UNHCR funding has also ended the access to free medical services at Hargeisa Group Hospital. Hundreds of chronically ill are now without medication.

Uganda



The refugee legal advocacy organisation, *Pugna Malum*, issued statements on 28 June and 11 July about the killing of a leading refugee advocate and others, and the detention of refugees at Kyaka II refugee settlement.

The refugee advocate, named Harriet Sina (shown left) was killed shortly after travelling to Kampala on behalf of the Refugee Leaders Forum to complain about abuses in Kyaka II. The group requested the impartial investigation into suspicious deaths at the camp.

The victims had been killed after speaking out about abuses including bribery, sexual exploitation, arbitrary arrest, intimidation, violence directed against refugees and killings. Families of those who complained were also put at risk.

In their second statement, the Refugee Leaders Forum listed another six killed in Bukere A section of the camp and four in Bukere B. The six killings in Bukere A, in addition to Harriet Sina, were Nyiramazayire Dorcas, Habimana Josue, Esperance, Vianney Mutsindu, Frank Masudi and Professor Gabi. Those killed in Bukere B were Claude Hakizimana Ishara, Nyota Mengha, Monday and Mahirwe Theophile. The report also named nine who had been arbitrarily detained and made a plea for the protection of complainants.

At the beginning of June 2026, six officials from Uganda's Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) were detained for investigation over alleged misconduct connected to the allegations made by the Refugee Leaders Forum but were later released without charge or legal action.

South Africa: Six killed in xenophobic attacks

Xenophobic violence has been a recurrent theme in South Africa, at least since 2009. Mob violence against foreigners erupted again in 2015, 2019 and 2021. The current bout, like those preceding it, is born out of social deprivation, unemployment, poor education and populist politics. Foreigners are scapegoats, blamed for taking jobs, increasing crime rates and being a burden on social services; reasons which are lifted straight out of the populist, right-wing playbook.

The organisation of weekly marches since the beginning of June smacks of central political backing but, although competing for the xenophobic vote – low hanging fruit for populist politicians throughout the world – is often successful in the short term, the *March and March* movement will damage the economy and society of South Africa in the medium to long term. Lessons may be drawn from Ghana in 1969 and Uganda in 1972.

The level of violence may not be as bad as 2021, when tens of thousands ran amok, looting and burning, but it is more organised and therefore more sinister. Live rounds and rubber bullets have been fired by police at protesters.

Reuters reported at least four deaths by 30 June.¹⁰⁸ The Oromia Refugee Network reported the killing of two young Oromo in Cape Town during the second week of July: Abdulatif Aliyi (upper image at the top of page 67), a 28-year old registered asylum-seeker, in South Africa since at least 2023, and Zubeer Umar (lower image, p.67), 25, registered since 2017.

¹⁰⁸ <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-african-cities-shuttered-ahead-anti-migrant-protests-2026-06-30/>

The question ‘Where are you from?’ is being asked by vigilante mobs, armed with staves, pangas, whips and pepper spray. Individuals are targeted based on physical appearance, skin colour, language or accent.

Beatings, stabbings and the theft of cash and mobile phones is reported as gangs search factories and businesses to check on employees, demanding to see their documents. Health facilities have been blockaded and schools surrounded. There is intimidation at checkpoints on city and town streets.

House-to-house searched have resulted in families dragged out of their beds and thrown onto the street.¹⁰⁹

Migrants have fled in their tens of thousands. *The Continent* mapped the exodus since *Reuters* reported ‘thousands’ of foreign nationals had left South Africa at the end of June. *The Continent* wrote that at least 53,000 had been deported or repatriated before 18 July,¹¹⁰ and 73,000 by 1 August.¹¹¹ By 21 August, 176,000 had left.¹¹²

Governments of Ghana, Nigeria and Malawi sent buses and planes to rescue their nationals. Nearly 1,000 gathered in the grounds of the Malawi consulate in Johannesburg before a fleet of buses took them to the border. The government of South Africa, in order to appease the *March and March* movement, set up fast-track courts to facilitate deportations and the Constitutional Court has barred asylum seekers from refiling if their initial claim was rejected.

Spaza shops (‘tuck shops’), small retail outlets run from shipping containers or small rented properties, are characteristic of neighbourhoods away from the big malls in city centres. *The New Humanitarian* wrote on 5 August that the 150,000 to 200,000 spaza shops, nearly all operated by Somali, Oromo or other Ethiopian nationals, create nearly 3 million jobs and contribute over 5% to South Africa’s GDP.

Spaza shops have become a focus for the vigilantes. Owners of the premises, like owners of rented accommodation, have evicted their tenants, in fear of the mobs. Others have been looted or burned down. Small businesses like these contribute more to the economy than city malls but few South Africans take them on because of the hard work and long hours.

Although 60% of 15 to 24-year olds are unemployed, there is a shortage of agricultural workers and those willing to undertake the back-breaking job of cutting sugar cane. Education is poor. Only one in five ten-year olds are able to read.

There are about 3 million migrants among the 65 million population of South Africa, under 4% of the total. It is inaccurate and unfair to scapegoat migrants and blame them for the country’s stagnating economy.



¹⁰⁹ *The Atlas*, Issue 3, 30 July. <https://theatlasnewspaper.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/the-atlas-issue-3-30-july-2026.pdf>

¹¹⁰ *The Continent*, Issue 245, 18 July.

¹¹¹ *The Continent*, Issue 247, 1 August.

¹¹² *The Continent*, Issue 250, 21 August.

When OSG visited in 2012 to obtain testimonies from Oromo and Ogadeni refugees and asylum-seekers,¹¹³ the level of corruption and cronyism in government departments (where refugee status was basically for sale) was as noticeable as the pervasive violence and xenophobia ingrained in South African society.

It is sad and ironic that the demise of apartheid brought more racism and xenophobia. The local elections on 4 November, until which the *March and March* movement is pledged to continue, could be a watershed, after which a less divided society may develop.

Sudan

The Oromia Refugee Network wrote on 5 July that Oromo communities and settlements in Sudan have been destroyed or occupied by warring factions in the civil war. ‘Deprived of secure humanitarian corridors, thousands are forced into a lethal second exodus across the Libyan desert or toward the Egyptian border, traveling without food, water, or medical support.’

Zambia

On 4 July, seven migrants from Ethiopia were apprehended and detained with the driver of the minibus in which they were travelling illegally through Zambian to South Africa.¹¹⁴ They were aged 19-27 and are pictured right. They await trial in detention.



The report also included the prosecution of a driver for carrying four refugees from Ethiopia in March 2026. He was fined K120,000 or faced nine months in prison. The fate of his imprisoned passengers was not stated.

USA

Temporary Protected Status

On 16 July, the *US Committee for Refugees and Migrants* reported that Temporary Protected Status which, theoretically, gives protection from deportation for those fleeing conflict and abuse in several countries, while awaiting asylum decision, was scheduled to be ended after a Supreme Court decision.¹¹⁵

TPS for Ethiopia, Haiti, Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Somalia and Myanmar was due to terminate on 19 August, with dates in September and October for El Salvador, Sudan and Ukraine. The stability of 1.3 million people in the USA is now under threat, including about 5,000 from Ethiopia.

Immigration detention

More than 68,400 immigration detainees were detained at any time in late 2025 and early 2026: 328,000 were arrested in total. Although the draconian methods used by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) paramilitaries last year are now less visible to the public eye, numbers have increased enormously in 2026, especially for those without criminal records.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ OSG Report 49. <https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/Report-49-South-Africa-June-2013-Sanctuary-at-a-price.pdf>

¹¹⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/100000013241767/posts/28026917523558647/?rdid=cZRqPOaIOI7091GL#>

¹¹⁵ <https://refugees.org/beyond-the-ruling-where-temporary-protected-status-stands/>

¹¹⁶ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2026/08/28/how-ice-arrests-immigrants-with-no-criminal-record-are-soaring-under-trump/>

Washington Post reported that 49,000 were newly detained in July, the highest monthly total so far. ICE has more power, backed by new legislation, but is operating more clandestinely, away from the public eye.¹¹⁷

Nonetheless, *Human Rights Watch* wrote of the rounding up of people ‘in raids on homes, work places, neighbourhood operations, Citizenship and Immigration Services offices and at traffic stops.’¹¹⁸ One detainee who was flown to a huge detention camp at Fort Bliss outside of El Paso, with a capacity for 5,000, was apprehended after another car ran into his at a stoplight.

In the camp at Fort Bliss, detainees were held incommunicado for months, without access to lawyers or family; denied medical treatment and held in filthy, unsanitary ‘conditions of confinement that amounted to enforced disappearance, cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment.’

There was excessive use of force, at least one extrajudicial killing, and ‘coercive third-country removals.’ One detainee was told ‘You’re only getting out deported or dead’, a far cry from ‘give me your poor huddled masses.’

Threats and promises

The Trump regime has threatened to withdraw US support to UNHCR,¹¹⁹ after his preferred candidate for deputy High Commissioner was turned down. The USA is traditionally the largest donor to UNHCR but most of the \$1.2 billion reduction in its budget from 2024 to 2025 was due to the halving of the US contribution down to \$812 million in 2025.¹²⁰

The USA is following the EU lead in outsourcing its migrant ‘problem.’ On 20 August, the first of a projected 1,200 migrants expelled from the USA arrived in Liberia. Of more than 20 countries accepting migrants from America in, often secret, arrangements, eleven are in Africa. They are Sierra Leone, Eswatini, Ghana, Senegal, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Rwanda, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Congo and Uganda.¹²¹

The USA is unable to return the migrants to their countries of origin for legal reasons. This has not prevented the USA deporting gay people to countries where being gay is a criminal offence.

In February, the Trump administration spent \$40 million to deport 300 migrants to countries other than their own.

¹¹⁷ <https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/six-months-after-minneapolis-ice-has-doubled-down/>

¹¹⁸ <https://www.hrw.org/report/2026/07/15/youre-only-getting-out-deported-or-dead/abusive-us-immigration-detention-at-ft>

¹¹⁹ <https://www.reuters.com/world/diplomatic-efforts-seek-avert-trump-split-with-un-refugee-agency-sources-say-2026-07-20/>

¹²⁰ <https://www.aei.org/commentary/the-unhcr-responded-to-us-funding-cuts-the-right-way/>

¹²¹ <https://apnews.com/article/africa-us-deportations-trump-administration-98c1a583687c700333466dc25324b473>

Appendix. West Wallega Human Rights Defenders Report

Human Rights Violations Continue in West Oromia, #3 (8)¹²²

August 2026

Deaths

No	Name	Age	Sex	Marital status	Woreda (District)	Kebele (Village)	Date of event	Remarks
1	Mitiku Chali	35	M	Married	Guliso	Sanki Dano	1/6/2026	Qerroo member
2	Ashenafi Abaje	30	>>	Single	Guliso	Chalia mil.camp	12/6/2026	NDF

The Ethiopian Constitution, article 15, grants the right to life, but the Ethiopian security forces are killing people extrajudicially. Even anti-guerrillas and militia members are authorized to commit extrajudicial killings against whoever they consider to be an OLA fighter or a member of any opposition party. For instance, a person whose name is Habtamu from Guliso District Security Office says that he has killed more than 36 women around Dembi Dollo while he was out on military operations.

Note that these claims go against international conventions. The man listed as number 2 in the table provided above is a member of the National Defence Forces in Guliso District. He was killed while he was trying to escape. Again last week they killed a National Defence Force member at Chalia Military Camp. He was killed by Shambal Atirsaw Yilma Yeshine, the current Commander-in-Chief in the Chalia Military Camp. When he tried to escape he was caught at Nekemte and they brought back to Chalia to be killed to terrify the other members of the military.

Bodily Harm

No	Name	Age	Sex	Marital status	Woreda (District)	Kebele (Village)	Date of event	Remarks
1	Jabesa Jaleta	60	M	Married	Guliso	Sanki Dano	7/7/2026	
2	Amenu Temesgen	35	M	Single	>>	Chalia 01	7/7/2026	
3	Kenasa Kalbesa	36	M	Married	>>	>>	7/7/2026	Ear drum perforated
4	Hana Yadesa	25	F	Single	>>	>>	14/7/2026	
5	Gutu Samuel	38	M	Married	>>	Sanki Dano	>>	
6	Gutu Endalu	30	M			>>	18/7/2026	
7	Ibsa Degefa	18	M	Single	>>	Chalia 01	>>	
8	Bona	17	M	>>	>>	>>	>>	
9	Ajaiba Taraka	17	M	>>	>>	>>	>>	

¹²² The first report from this group was published on the OSG website at https://oromiasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Violations-in-West-Oromia_-Abuses-in-five-districts-October-2018-April-2021-2.pdf and was included in OSG Report 56. Their second and third reports were incorporated in Reports 58 and 59. Subsequent reports on the OSG website were April 2022, May 2023, February 2024 and July 2024. These 4th to 7th reports are summarised in OSG Reports 60, 63, 65 and 67, respectively. This report is #8 received by OSG.

10	Amansisa Ephrem	20	M	>>	>>	>>	>>	
11	Fedasa Wakshuma	24	M	Married	>>	Tegie	>>	
12	Gutu Endalu	23	>>	Single	>>	Chalia 01	>>	
13	Israel Tesfa	25	>>	Married	>>	>>	>>	

The Ethiopian Constitution, Article 16, grants protection against bodily harm. But the Ethiopian security forces are deliberately committing bodily harm.

Arrests

No	Name	Age	Sex	Marital status	Woreda (District)	Kebele (Village)	Date of event	Remarks
1	Degaga Haile	36	M	Single	Guliso	Falamtu Dill	7/7/26	
2	Ayana Bijiga	25	>>	>>	>>	Tegie	>>	
3	Fedasa Wakshuma	28	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	
4	Kebena Bedasa	23	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	
5	Wancha Jiregna	25	F	Single	>>	Chalia 01	>>	
6	Gadise Ayana	18	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	
7	Meti Tesgera	19	>>	>>	>>	>>		
8	Hana Yadesa	25	>>	>>	>>	>>	13/6/26	
9	Wagari Haile	40	>>	Married	>>	Inanani Korme	>>	
10	Tekilu Abata	50	>>	>>	>>	Chalia 01	>>	
11	Latera Gutu	17	M	Single	>>	Sanki Dano	14/7/26	
12	Thomas Waktola	40	M	Married	>>	Chalia 01	06/08/26	
13	Israel Tamiru	22	M	Single	>>	>>	>>	
14	Amenti Mereba	20	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	
15	Wondimu Getacho	45	>>	Married	>>	>>	>>	
16	Efa Yadesa	30	>>	Single	>>	>>	>>	
17	Tamiru Bedasa	35	M	Married	>>	>>	>>	
18	Kenasa Jaleta	30	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	
19	Merera Kenea	18	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	
20	Mideksa Yonas	17	>>	Single	>>	>>	11/8/26	student

The Ethiopian Constitution, Article **17**, grants citizens the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest.

The Ethiopian Constitution, Article **32**, grants the right to movement. But no right of movement exists in Oromia and in West Oromia in particular. The establishment of a Command Post is intended to be temporary; it is supposed to have an inherent time limitation. But in Oromia the Command Post is everlasting.

One implication of this is that the government could not convince the Oromo nationals in the process of the National Dialogue Commission tenure. This is so because almost all of their deal is fake or bogus, unreliable such as fake justice, fake police stations, fake election, fake democracy fake National Dialogue etc.

Nowadays they arrest peoples by force for national military service and ask them money whether they are eligible or not. They use this opportunity as means of income, this is the duty of PP members. They arrest people on the way to markets, in churches, from public meetings, etc. No right of movement exists, even though the Ethiopian Constitution, Article 32 grants the right to movement. What to do? They don't respect the country's Constitution, penal codes, even the international laws. Let the international community judge also.

Social Services

Electricity is interrupted several times a day as well as the data network and Internet. Without electricity so many things are difficult – communications, banking systems, grain mills, production.

The community is suffering a lot, even to feed families. Also they suffer scarcity of the water supply, scarcity of commodities, nationwide inflation, etc.

The banking system is very difficult. They don't give cash all the time. They say, "No, we don't have cash!" Also connection problems pose difficulties. People are suffering most of the time with transportation problems, especially poor roads in the countryside. They do not maintain the roads at the right time. How can they maintain in the rainy season? This is just to destroy.

There is absolutely no sustainable development in Ethiopia, especially in Oromia.

The other thing is over-taxation. Nowadays citizens are about to migrate for over-taxation added on top of forced corridor development in Oromia. What to do? Where to go?

Focus on a Special Case

This child (pictured below in an orange dress) is a 5 years old orphan. She lost her father at the age of 3 months due to a gunshot fired by the Oromia Special Forces. Her mother abandoned her and married another man. Imagine how heartbreaking it is! We got all these pieces of information from the girl's tutor. The name of her father, Gutu Alemayehu, was revealed in one of our previous death reports.¹²³ It is notable how the Ethiopian troops are immoral and criminal in relation to the laws of the country; they don't respect the country's constitution or even the international laws.



Orphan



Victim



Victim

¹²³ He is named Gutu Alamayo in the [first report from the West Wallega Human Rights Defenders group](#) on the OSG website.



Victim



Private Health institutions meeting held at
Gimbi Town, organized by the Zonal Health Office
16th July 2018 E.C

The Ethiopian Constitution in article 16 grants protection against bodily harm, but the Ethiopian armed forces are easily committing bodily harms as you see above. As you see in the photo provided above, the West Wollega Zonal Health Office called this assembly meeting. But the Zonal Administrator by the name of Telila came to the meeting said, “Don’t only give health service. Be armed to free your country.” Note that the agenda was about health service, but he brought the agenda of national security. They mix things like this. At other times, if you ask them, they say that Oromia is free.

**The rural community
travels on such a poor
road in Guliso District at
a place called Gara Gute.
As of August 2026 G.C**

