ADDA BILISUMMAA OROMOO (ABO-WBO)

OROMO LIBERATION FRONT جبهة تحرير أوروموا

Date: *November 27, 2026* **Nr.:** *IEABO WBO/11-03-2026*

Guyyaa: *Sadaasa 27, 2026* تاريخ **Lakk.:** *IEABO-WBO/11-03-2026* رقم

Abiy Ahmed's Self-Incriminating Parliamentary Admission

(OLF-OLA Press Release)

Abiy Ahmed's parliamentary appearance yesterday was the usual spectacle of fabrications, conjecture, factual inconsistency, and profound disregard for the welfare of the people. Beneath the familiar rhetoric, however, were several revealing admissions that warrant serious scrutiny. One is of particular significance: that his regime has actively armed civilians under the stated pretext of enabling them to "protect themselves."

This is precisely the pattern that has unfolded across Oromia over the past several years. Consider Arsi, which has recently been at the top of the news agenda. For years, regime cadres have told Oromo residents in the area that the PP is an "exclusively Oromo government," as though its eight years of reign of terror have delivered anything to the Oromo people other than death, destruction, and dispossession. On the other hand, Amhara civilians in the same areas were armed by the regime.

The consequences of such a policy are neither mysterious nor unforeseeable. Selectively arming civilian populations, regardless of their ethnic background, in an already polarized environment is sure to cultivate suspicion, deepen communal divisions, and undermine the foundations of peaceful coexistence. It was intended to create the conditions in which communities that have lived alongside one another for generations are increasingly encouraged to regard one another as security threats.

Interestingly, however, some in the Opposition have defended civilian armament as an exercise of the right to self-defense, occasionally invoking the United States' constitutional protection of the right to bear arms. These claims are correct in principle, and the right to individual self-defense should never be in dispute. Nor is the right of individuals to seek protection from any form of violence in question. The problem, however, lies in equating an individual's right to possess arms with the Abiy regime's ignorant policy of selectively arming civilian groups and mobilizing them within counter-insurgency operations. These are fundamentally different propositions, with radically different political, legal, and security implications. Some of the key distinctions:

1. The American constitutional framework does not provide a precedent for the state to organize civilian armament along ethnic lines to exploit historical and social fault lines.

Whatever the controversies surrounding the Second Amendment, the right to bear arms cannot reasonably be invoked to justify a regime policy that selectively arms communal groups in an environment of ethnic tension. The relevant questions are not simply whether civilians may possess firearms, but who supplies the weapons, for what purpose, and with what foreseeable consequences.

2. The problem also extends beyond the distribution of firearms. Abiy's security forces have repeatedly incorporated and/or mobilized some armed civilians into counter-insurgency operations alongside regular regime forces, at least on an intermittent basis. Civilians who are armed and deployed in support of regime military operations are being exposed to further harm, not protected as the regime wants to claim. The regime also creates a reality under which they lose protection under the law because their actual role, conduct, command relationships, and participation in hostilities become relevant to their legal status under international humanitarian law.
3. The historical rationale often invoked in defense of the right to bear arms is fundamentally different from the policy Abiy is pursuing. In the American constitutional tradition, the right has been associated, among other things, with safeguarding individuals against tyranny and the excessive concentration of state power. Abiy Ahmed’s policy, by contrast, is designed to produce precisely the opposite effect: to intensify horizontal insecurity and antagonism between communities, thereby undermining their capacity to build the solidarity necessary for collective resistance to authoritarian rule. Rather than preserving the means through which people might resist state oppression, this policy is designed to turn communities against one another, weakening their ability to pursue common political interests and hold the regime accountable.
4. Even in the United States, where guns are not distributed by the state along ethnic or other social fissures, widespread firearm possession and misuse have produced serious public-safety challenges. Gun violence remains a major social and political concern, and the scope of the constitutional right itself is the subject of sustained legal and political debate.

Civilian ethnic minorities who live among the Oromo throughout Oromia are our brothers and sisters. They do not inherently have interests, material needs, or aspirations fundamentally different from those of their Oromo neighbors. Their security and well-being are inseparable from the security and well-being of the communities with whom they share their lives. No one is better placed to protect them than the people among whom they live.

Repeatedly, however, political intervention by the regime in the relationship between these communities—many of whom have lived alongside one another for generations—has proved, beyond the shadow of a doubt and repeatedly, deeply incendiary. The primary cause of insecurity against ethnic minorities in Oromia is a regime that leaves no stone unturned to turn them against their Oromo brothers. We must not lose sight of one of central pillars of Abiy Ahmed's political survival: the deliberate exploitation of every available division, particularly ethnic fault lines, to

prevent our peoples from recognizing their shared interests and pursuing a common political future against his rule of terror.

By his own admission in Parliament yesterday, Abiy Ahmed assumed political responsibility for the regime's practice of arming civilians. That admission cannot be detached from all the consequences of the policy. Some in the opposition, on their part, should seriously reflect on the short- and long-term effects of the positions currently held.



OLF-OLA High Command

November 27, 2026