Wollega: As one of the most militarily saturated regions in the country, Wollega has, over the past eight years, endured successive configurations of regime-backed regular and irregular forces. Among them is a small armed group claiming to operate in the name of the Amhara, a group notorious for attacks against Oromo civilians. The group was initially trained, armed, and deployed directly by the regime, to help counter the OLA during the war against the TDF and the OLA. It was only after the conflict erupted in the Amhara region that elements of the group broke formally from their positions within the regime’s militia structures.
The regime subsequently pivoted. Rather than deploying the group directly as part of its militia, it began using the group as an instrument to mobilize Oromo sentiment against the war in the Amhara region—particularly by attributing massacres of Oromo civilians to this group, regardless of which actors were actually responsible. Having witnessed the political utility of public anger generated by such atrocities, the regime had a strategic interest in keeping the force alive. The pattern was visible in repeated encounters in which ENDF or Oromia forces would ostensibly move to “confront” the group, only to withdraw under circumstances that left weapons and other resources behind. Intelligence was also shared in ways that enabled the group to rob money and weapons. Given the group’s openly anti-Oromo posture—reflected both in its conduct and the name it carries— its sustained presence among the Oromo is virtually impossible without the regime’s continued direct or indirect support.
When discussions of cooperation among opposition forces first began to surface, the regime intensified the same play book. A recurring cycle of atrocities followed, to deepen mistrust, inflame communal tensions, and make any prospective cooperation among opposition actors politically more difficult.
Amhara forces across the river saw in this small, armed faction that spoke their language and jumped on it as an opportunity to extend influence beyond the Amhara region. They failed to consider the long-term political consequences of such a gamble. The association with such a faction of risk producing political costs that far exceed any conceivable short-term military advantage. We therefore urge Amhara forces to cease irresponsible media briefings concerning this group and to make their position unequivocal by dissociating themselves from it.
Tsimdo: The OLA is neither involved in, nor is not a component of Tsimdo. However, an alliance involving opposition forces stretching from west to east and from south to north is taking shape.
The emerging cooperation is centered on two fundamental matters. First, opposition forces agree to end horizontal confrontations and redirect their efforts toward the source of destruction affecting all of us. Second, an agreement to create a broad-based transitional political opening through which the people of the country can address their political demands through direct participation.
It is not an agreement on substantive political questions. It is a procedural consensus. No party has received a mandate to negotiate, settle, or predetermine the fundamental political questions of our people. Those questions belong to the people themselves and must ultimately be addressed through their direct participation. The immediate responsibility of opposition forces is therefore to create the political and security conditions in which such participation becomes possible.
Ongoing civilian mobilization in Oromia: It is now public knowledge that, across the areas of Oromia where the OLA operates, Abiy Ahmed has directed the arming and mobilization of civilians. This is not a new policy. The practice dates back to at least 2021, when the regime began advancing similar arrangements under the pretext of “protecting Amhara civilians.”
The central issue, therefore, should not be whether the PP has finally acknowledged that it cannot indefinitely rely on conventional forces. That reality has been apparent for years. The proliferation of regime-backed irregular armed actors across Oromia is evidence of this admission. The urgent task now is to separate the regime from the Oromo people behind whom it desperately seeks cover. Abiy Ahmed should not be allowed to hide behind the Oromo. Therefore, all stakeholders should refrain from falling into traps of the regime every time fault lines are used and carefully separate the regime from the people in all engagements.
OLF-OLA High Command
September 17, 2026
#Oromia #Ethiopia
